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Abstract 
This thesis aimed to develop a paradigm for the study of anomaly handling and to 
investigate the factors that influence success in detecting and classifying anomalies. A 
simulated anomaly-handling environment was created to mimic an intelligence analysis task 
in a security setting. A series of experiments was designed to test hypotheses concerning 
sources of difficulty in detecting potential anomalies and making decisions about appropriate 
classifications of potentially anomalous events. Results across all experiments showed that 
complex problems, representing anomalies, were more difficult to solve than simple 
problems, and that this poor performance was consistent with the use of suboptimal strategies 
based on recognition of perceptual characteristics rather than inferences drawn from available 
data. Performance on complex problems was reduced still further when participants were 
exposed to trials that established a mental set. However, performance was improved when 
participants were given feedback on the correctness of their responses to each trial, which 
eliminated the negative effects of exposure to mental set. Another factor that impacted on 
successful decision-making was the cost of making errors. When participants were faced with 
a penalty for making incorrect decisions, solution rates improved compared with when 
performance was not related to reward. This has consequences for anomaly handling 
industries where the consequence of failure of often high. Unexpectedly, a number of the 
results indicated that there are situations where mental set may confer a benefit to decision 
making in a task of anomaly categorisation. Given the dominance of recognition-based 
strategies, it appears that mental set can refine the detection of perceptually relevant patterns, 
which can signal sudden changes in pattern that can lead to a switch from recognition-based 
to inferential task solution strategies.  Overall, the merits for the use of simulated 
environments in critical decision making areas are discussed, and the contributory factors 
towards successful anomaly handling are analysed.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview and scope 
In July 2008, the United States of America conducted a drone strike in Nangarhar 
province Afghanistan, after spotting a large convoy of individuals believed to belong to 
terrorist organisations. However, after the strike hit the target, these individuals were later 
found to have no links to such organisations and were in fact travelling to a local wedding. 
This attack killed 47 civilians including the bride, with most victims being women and 
children (Sturke, 2008). In another incident in November 2008, after fighting insurgents near 
a town in Kandahar province, Afghanistan, a US drone strike targeted a nearby building 
containing multiple occupants believed to be those same insurgents. The drone strike hit the 
compound, but the building was being used by women and children to celebrate a local 
wedding. The strike killed 37 civilians (Wafa & McDonald, 2008). 
Drone strikes offer a fast, precise response to threats, minimising the risk to ground 
troops, so it is no wonder they are well utilised. However, they are only as effective as the 
decisions to employ them. In both the above examples, the whole picture was incomplete, 
and it led to a large loss of civilian life. It may have been that those strikes were ‘signature 
strikes’ – where the strike decision is based on a pattern of suspicious behaviour, rather than 
on gathered intelligence that indicates a specific target (Ackerman, 2016).  
In signature strikes, a profile of suspicious behaviour is used in the decision to strike. 
But how do you tell the difference between a wedding convoy moving between villages and 
an armed convoy on its way to recruit more insurgents? What does a house full of insurgents 
look like compared to a house full of wedding revellers? It is possible that while insurgent 
activity is common and under constant scrutiny, drone operators and intelligence officials 
have learnt what insurgency ‘looks like’, consisting of patterns of human behaviour that 
usually correlate with insurgent activity. However, there may be less frequent events, such as 
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a wedding, that does not happen on a day-to-day basis and where the conditions appear very 
similar to that of insurgency. Large groups of people travelling large distances and 
congregating in one place may be suspicious to the military in the majority of instances, but 
far less frequently this pattern may also match something of an innocent nature, such as a 
wedding party. In both instances, we can observe an unusual change in the environment, 
maybe a number of vehicles travelling in convoy, but how do we make a decision about what 
that represents? And is the military nature of drones and their familiar use to combat 
insurgents going to impact on the way a drone operator may interpret that situation? 
This is the essence of anomaly handling – when a change is noticed, how is it 
interpreted when there are multiple possibilities, and how does this change when some 
possibilities are far more probable than others? While rare innocent events may appear like 
more common events of a suspicious nature, it is perhaps no surprise that mistakes are 
sometimes made. When combat policy such as signature strikes rely on human interpretation, 
there is always the possibility that the human gets it wrong. It is perhaps in this failure to 
distinguish between two similar looking events that has created an environment where drone 
strikes are able to hit weddings on multiple occasions. News sources found that US drones 
had hit eight wedding parties between 2001-2013 (Englehardt, 2013), and while these 
fortunately are rare events, the repeated nature of such tragedies may imply a procedural 
reason for why this is occurring.  If we were to better our understanding of how anomalies 
such as these are handled and processed by decision-makers, it may be possible to explore 
what options exist to reduce the likelihood of errors. As of mid-2016, signature strikes are 
still utilised by the US military drone program (Ackerman, 2016). 
In a wider context, anomalies are events that are unexpected and do not fall within 
normal parameters. It is important to understand the ability to interpret and comprehend 
anomalies because they are often indicative that a system is deviating from its normal state 
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(e.g., irregular sensor data from a power plant may be symptomatic of an undetected problem, 
or a sudden large convoy of fast moving vehicles may indicate an impending insurgent 
attack). By being able to interpret anomalies successfully, much of the potential damage 
posed by these threats may be prevented or mitigated. Many industries use analysts to 
scrutinise data for anomalies in an attempt to identify problems in in such systems (e.g., in 
the control of process plants) or to counter malicious activity (e.g., fraud investigators, 
military intelligence).  
Automated anomaly detection systems have improved security in many industries. 
Even though automated systems are typically closely supervised by human decision-makers, 
there is little psychological literature on humans’ capacity to interpret these anomalies. This 
thesis aims to explore the decision-making processes of anomaly handlers, and to identify key 
psychological mechanisms that allow successful interpretation of anomalies to occur. 
To explore the concept of anomaly handling, a simple computerised problem-solving 
task was developed. The task involves participants finding and interpreting a pattern of 
anomalies within a simulated security environment. This environment simulates a domain in 
which our concept of anomaly handling is used regularly and has been discussed already, that 
of military intelligence. The intelligence context is one where data will be analysed with the 
intent of discovering patterns of behaviour that might be associated with malicious intent, 
while facing the same potential problems of discerning a threat from a non-threat when the 
two look very similar. The research follows on from qualitative research already undertaken 
to examine effectiveness of problem solvers in intelligence analysis (e.g., Mumaw, Roth, 
Vincente, & Burns, 2000; Morely, Ball, & Ormerod, 2006). The objective of this research 
was to devise and use a method that can assess anomaly-handling abilities quantitatively in a 
laboratory setting. The process of creating the simulated environments, demonstrating the 
requirements of the task, and how the design of the task meets these requirements is 
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addressed in Chapter 2. 
One of the major themes reviewed in this thesis is decision-making, and most 
importantly, understanding why it goes wrong. A literature review of decision-making and 
relevant cognitive biases can be found in the current chapter. Some key areas are outlined 
below to develop the perspective from which this work is focussed. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973a; 1973b) and Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
developed a series of theories to explain why human decision making that involves 
uncertainty and concerns risk is often subject to a number of cognitive biases that arise 
through the application of heuristics. Heuristics are mental rules-of-thumb, or shortcuts, 
formed by experience and are beneficial by reducing cognitive load. While heuristics have 
been shown to have advantages for rapid processing of routine decisions, they may create 
problems for anomaly interpretation. If heuristics are cognitive shortcuts based on 
experience, then the low frequency of some anomalous events means that decisions based 
upon heuristics formed from common experience may impede the identification and 
interpretation of an anomaly.  For example, if every vehicle convoy a drone operator has seen 
so far results in an insurgent attack, then the operator may associate convoys with insurgent 
attacks. However, there may be other causes (such a wedding) that creates similar signals. As 
the operator is exposed to this on a much less frequent basis then it is understandable how a 
misattribution could occur. Literature on how error can be introduced into rational decision-
making is discussed in Section 1.2.2.  
Alternatively, anomaly handlers may develop new heuristics to combat the 
uncertainty of environments in which they work, which may improve performance. In the 
drone example, after a wedding has been hit, those decision-makers will be aware that the 
behaviour used to determine the strike criteria was inaccurate, and may develop further 
criteria to be sure their next strike doesn’t make the same mistake. After viewing enough 
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satellite imagery of typical wedding behaviour, they will be able to develop a more refined 
set of behaviour that could distinguish between weddings and insurgents. This view is 
supported by the literature on expertise, where research in the field of Naturalistic Decision 
Making (NDM) suggests that experts in their domain develop decision-making strategies 
exclusive to that domain (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993). A review of the 
literature on expertise and its boundaries can be found in Section 1.3. 
Although these global aspects of anomaly handling are important, we are interested in 
specific elements that fit with the task paradigm chosen for our research. The task allows 
investigation of the contribution that factors such as mental set, feedback and cost of error 
have on anomaly handling. By manipulating these factors, their effects on performance and 
strategy choice can be examined to determine how critical those factors are for successful 
anomaly handling.  
Mental set, traditionally known as the Einstellung effect, was first described by 
Luchins (1942). A mental set is associated with a rigid approach to problem-solving, often 
with fixation on previously used strategies that have yielded consistent positive results. 
Mental set is important in anomaly handling because by their very nature, anomalies are 
different to what has come before them. Individuals whose primary job is to carry out similar 
duties in their day-to-day working environments may become susceptible to creating a mental 
set based around their workplace actions, and thus become less sensitive to the presence of 
anomalies and their consequences. For example, if the signature strike procedure is used by 
drone commanders to target a large group of individuals in vehicles, and is successful on the 
first 10 occasions, this may increase the likelihood of assessing the next large group to be 
valid targets when it is in fact yet another wedding party.  The issue of mental set is further 
addressed in section 1.2.2.  
It is also important to examine the role of thinking styles. Human thinking has been 
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described using a dual-process model, identifying heuristic and analytic types of thinking 
(Evans, 1989; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003). Heuristic thinking is more 
accessible, and expressed through quick, routine decision-making, whereas analytic thinking 
is slower, and utilises more cognitive resources. It could be that switching between heuristic 
and analytic modes of thinking may lead to a reduction in errors. Factors such as introduction 
of a cost to incorrect decisions or providing feedback to participants may encourage 
participants to use analytic strategies that lead to more efficient strategy selection and thereby 
enhance anomaly handling performance, and these are explored in the experiments reported 
in this thesis. 
The aim of the thesis research was to develop a novel method to investigate the nature 
of anomaly handling, capable of identifying the psychological mechanisms used when 
undertaking anomaly handling tasks. The research provides quantitative data that explores 
novice performance and strategy selection in anomaly handling. 
1.2 Decision-making 
1.2.1 What goes into a decision 
Possession of information is critical for a decision. Without information a decision is 
little more than a guess. So how do we determine what information is necessary before a 
successful decision can be made? Dawes and Corrigan (1974) suggested that the key to 
successful decisions is to determine cues to necessary task information. Cues are features in 
an environment from which relevant information can be extracted dependent on the 
perceivers’ ability to interpret them. For example, if a drone operator was to identify hostile 
groups, a cue that there is a threat may include the number of people in an area, the behaviour 
of those people, whether they are carrying weapons, or the mode of travel. These are all cues 
that an experienced operator can use to form an assessment of the threat on the ground. These 
are cues as they only imply the nature of the event, in this case, threat. So a cue is an aspect 
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of the environment from which useful information can be obtained, an informational object. 
In the case of decision-making, decisions are often based upon the information extracted from 
these cues.  
Dawes and Corrigan (1974) suggest that the key to decision-making is an individuals’ 
ability to perceive their environment and to use the relevant cues to extract the most pertinent 
information related to a specific decision. To return to our drone example, if an operator has 
to decide that a situation is dangerous and that a strike should go ahead, then relevant cues 
would not only include the behaviour of targets, and presence of weapons, but also extend to 
whether nearby friendly troops are out of range, or whether there are a large number of 
civilians in the area. The tasks of identifying hostiles and conducting a strike utilise 
information available from the environment, but each may require different information. 
Cues are important because they impart information to us that can better our understanding of 
a situation or problem. The environment is filled with cues; learning to discriminate what is 
an important cue from an irrelevant cue is critical in decision-making and anomaly handling. 
This is the basis for using a simulation in our research with multiple information streams 
which will act as cues. By creating multiple information streams it is possible to manipulate 
what information is relevant or irrelevant to solving a problem. This will allow those with the 
ability to distinguish between the relevance of cues to perform better than those that do not.  
How people identify the relationship between cues and their outcomes is the starting 
point for this thesis. The real world is a noisy, messy place with many simultaneous cues, so 
how do individuals’ learn which cues are valuable? How do people search their environments 
for the cues that they can extract the information they are looking for? Laboratory studies 
conducted on information search often examined the concept of ‘cue validity’, the extent to 
which a cue can be predictive of a particular outcome. This is commonly explored using a 
Multi-Cue Probability Learning (MCPL) paradigm (e.g., Friedman & Massaro, 1998), where 
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two or more cues are presented, usually perceptual, consisting of shapes, colours, etc. 
Participants must then predict an outcome, such as movement, or appearance of consequent 
stimuli. Participants are able to predict the outcome from the cues because each has a specific 
weighting which is predictive of an outcome, and participants learn these weightings over 
multiple trials. Friedman and Massaro used a medical diagnosis task in which participants 
had to predict one of two diseases (the outcome) from a patient’s blood pressure and 
temperature (the cues). They found that, even though the rate of occurrence of each disease 
was different, participants were able to extract relevant information from the cues and 
became efficient at diagnosis.  
Klayman (1988) found that one of the most important functions of a decision-maker is 
the natural acquisition of valid cues from the environment.  He presented participants with a 
geometric-spatial task where participants had to estimate the movement of shapes based upon 
the shapes’ physical characteristics, but participants were not explicitly told which features of 
the shapes were cues to each movement. Not only were participants adept at identifying 
which cues were relevant, but also when they could test their own hypotheses regarding cue 
relationships they outperformed those who were merely able to observe the cues. This 
suggests that individuals can learn causal relationships between abstract stimuli under 
laboratory conditions. This research is imperative to this thesis as it shows that novice 
participants are able to understand the role of specific cues in an informational environment 
and perform tasks based on the relationship of these cues. This ability will be required to 
solve the problems that appear in our experimental paradigm and that previous research has 
found novice participants adept at doing so will not justify a poor performance on the task, 
which means poor performance can be associated with less ability in anomaly handling. 
Similarly, Lagnado and Sloman (2004) have shown that intervention, the ability of the 
participant to have direct input, provides greater basis for learning than just observation in 
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causal reasoning. They produced a task similar to MCPL, where multiple cues lead to an 
outcome event, with cues part of either a causal chain, where one event follows another, 
followed by a third in sequential order (AàBàC) or a common cause for an event where 
there are two separate events that can independently cause it (AàCßB). Participants either 
observed multiple presentations of scenarios, or were able to intervene with the task and set 
their own terms for A and B. They found that intervention (directly manipulating the 
conditions that lead to the outcome) greatly assisted learning the causal relationship between 
cues and outcome.  
Although intervening with a situation can help individuals to learn cue validity over a 
number of trials, the scarcity of events in anomaly handling domains means that this kind of 
learning is not always possible. There are industries where discrete one-off observations 
provide the only available information. How an individual can learn what cues are 
predictively valid in a potentially high-risk environment where anomalous events are rare 
holds the key to how the ability to understand that environment can be improved. In the 
example scenario used in this thesis, an intelligence officer in a security setting has access to 
imagery of a remote country via satellite, where satellite images depict resources being 
distributed towards various population centres. There is a relationship between the 
distribution of resources and the security situation on the ground. A large build-up of 
resources in one area could indicate that local rebels are stockpiling munitions, food and 
medicine in preparation of an impending attack. Alternatively, a build-up of resources may be 
due to adverse weather events that make some areas unreachable necessitating stock-piling at 
regions that are accessible.  In situations like this, the observer does not have multiple trials to 
learn relationships prior to showing accurate performance levels, as any error could be costly 
to security. The observer relies on knowledge and expertise to analyse cues of the 
environment in making their decision. This scenario is the basis of the simulation used 
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throughout this thesis to test and understand anomaly handling and is described in detail in 
Chapter 2. The simulation was designed to represent a mirror of the threat (e.g., insurgents) 
and no-threat (e.g., wedding party) situations described in the start of this thesis, where a 
harmful and a peaceful outcome might look similar on initial presentation. For the nature of 
this task, rather than committing to aggressive action such as a drone strike, the paradigm has 
been constructed around a scenario of observation, and does not imply the loss of civilian life 
in case of errors. 
Studies that examine information search strategies have focussed on the order in 
which information is gained, as a measure of the priority that participants place on that item 
of information. For example, Payne (1976) used the apartment task in which options 
(different apartments) had features (rent, location, etc.) and participants were told to search 
this information for their preferred apartments. He found that, while there was variation in 
search orders between individuals, there was consistency within individuals across searches 
when comparing between two alternative choices. He also found that search order changed 
with task complexity. When multiple options were introduced, participants no longer 
prioritised information to choose between competing options, but instead prioritized 
information to eliminated weaker options.  The apartment task taps into differences in 
subjective preferences of participants who value different qualities in a home, which explains 
the lack of consistency between their searches. The security scenario described above has no 
personal preferences, instead providing a task with well-defined criteria and an optimal 
solution. Thus, the current research examined the nature of information search in a setting 
that allowed assessment of inter-individual information search strategies to explore 
differences between strategic approaches independent of personal preferences. The paradigm 
included multiple information streams to enable participants to make decisions whilst having 
all available information that would allow a correct solution to be discovered. 
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Fasolo, McClellend and Lange (2005) examined consumer choice and information 
search when purchasing a new item. Similar to the apartment task, participants were 
presented with a list of cameras, each with numerous features such as cost and optical zoom. 
However, they used a recommendation system whereby the participants selected the option 
that best fitted the description given to them, thereby eliminating subjective preferences 
present in Fasolo et al.’s Apartment task. They found that when an option had conflicting 
features (i.e., it fit the description in one attribute but not another), search became more 
difficult, and participants reported less confidence in their choices. Participants’ information 
search strategies focused on features that were considered most important, and included 
searches for alternative choices that may better match their recommendation. If no option 
satisfied these criteria, participants’ either searched further for more information or attributed 
weightings of importance to each feature. This is important to the task developed for this 
thesis as anomalies are situations that will possess conflicting information. Therefore 
information search will be more difficult and participants may attribute a ranking of 
importance to the cues available in the task paradigm, this will be important later when 
discussing the development of heuristic strategies. 
Bettman, Johnson, Luce and Payne (1993) outline a trade-off between accuracy and 
effort in information search, in which individuals either process all information regarding 
options to make an accurate choice, expending more time, effort and mental resources while 
doing so, or they focus on highly weighted attributes and identify an acceptable option with 
lower effort. They found that when faced with a conflicted choice, participants were more 
likely to pay attention to all of the information in an attempt to process it accurately. When no 
conflict existed, people used less information and more readily accepted an option as 
acceptable. Thus, participants appeared willing to expend effort if it increased the chance of 
making a correct decision, but use heuristics when searching among options for more simple 
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decisions. Extra effort was only expended if participants noticed a conflict in the information 
supporting a decision. In some real-life situations, conflicting information may exist but, 
perhaps due to domain unfamiliarity or complexity, the observer may not be aware of it. If 
this is the case, then we might expect the individual to utilize heuristics and make suboptimal 
decisions. 
How does this notion of effort and accuracy trade-offs affect anomaly handling? 
Anomalies are indicated by unexpected cues that indicate a problem. Experience may teach 
individuals that investment in a particular cue of low informative value is not worth the effort 
of attending to it, and so when this cue changes to become diagnostically relevant it already 
has a preset low weighting for how useful it is. If individuals do not recognize there is a 
conflict in the available information, due to the presence of an anomaly, then they will be 
more likely to process it as a routine problem, and not expend additional cognitive resources 
to complete a search of all available information, thus ignoring potentially important 
information that a problem exists. 
Fiske and Taylor (1991) found that when overwhelmed with information or when 
facing a topic that is not fully understood, individuals will seek less information because they 
are unsure what is diagnostically relevant, and therefore will not wish to expend mental 
resources for uncertain gain. If domain unfamiliarity reduces the amount of information that 
is attended to, then it could be expected that familiarity with a domain will allow for high 
amounts of information to be attended to. Evidence in support of this was found by Phelps 
and Shanteau (1978). They found that experts are capable of incorporating large amounts of 
information into their decisions. They studied expert livestock judges in agricultural contests. 
Their experts were given descriptions of livestock that varied on 11 criteria and were asked to 
judge the quality of an animal based upon a given description. They found that experts 
referred to all 11 criteria in their judgements. Phelps and Shanteau also indicated that an 
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expert can access this information in a schematic fashion. This was evidenced in a second 
study, where the same livestock judges judged animals based upon photographs, they found 
experts used a maximum of three characteristics to base their decisions on. They suggested 
that experts are able to extrapolate multiple features of an animal from a single visible 
characteristic, suggesting use of a formal knowledge structure.  Based on the findings of both 
Fiske and Taylor (1991) and Phelps and Shanteau (1978), if both experts and non-experts 
conserve mental energy and have the same motivation to succeed, then a possible reason the 
expert acquires more information is because the expert’s knowledge structure is set up in a 
way that makes retrieval less taxing.  
Experts are not experts because they can find more information, but they find more 
information because they are expert. A review by Shanteau (1992) found that expert and non-
expert populations often utilize the same limited amount of information, yet experts still 
possess higher fidelity in their judgments and decisions. It appears that experts do not need a 
greater capacity for information to achieve better decisions, but their success is based instead 
on the internal weighting of individual cues and interpretation of the cues themselves. To 
explore this notion in anomaly handling, we developed a simulation that used few cues, in 
which success was measured by understanding of how cues interact rather than on capacity of 
memory. This enabled an assessment of the relative importance of quality versus quantity of 
information used in anomaly handling. This also has the added benefit of not isolating our 
simulation for use in expert communities only. Following Fiske and Taylor (1991), by using a 
minimal number of cues, novices will still be able to attend to all information. And given 
Shanteau’s (1992) finding that better decisions can be made with a smaller number of cues, 
this would still make performance on our task one of better understanding rather than domain 
familiarity.  
Information that has been attended to and acquired can be used to inform a decision. 
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But in what ways can this information be used? Dawes and Corrigan (1974) suggested it 
could be as simple as adding all of the diagnostic cues together to come to a conclusion. 
Studies by Dawes, Faust and Meehl (1989) and Grove and Meehl (1996) have shown that, by 
using a weighted additive function, whereby each piece of information is assigned a value as 
to how informative it is and then these are added together, can outperform the judgements of 
experts. Sarbin (1943) conducted a study that compared school counsellors’ predictions of 
students’ academic success against a simple equation. The counsellors had a wealth of 
experience in managing students, an 8-page document detailing the specifics of each student, 
access to all previous test scores, results from personality measures, and even an interview 
with the student before making their prediction. Sarbin found that a two-item equation, using 
just two of the test scores that the counsellors also had access to created equally powerful 
predictions of the students’ future academic grades. A meta-analysis by Grove, Zald, Lebow, 
Snitz and Nelson (2000) examined 136 experiments that compared simple statistical models 
against the judgements of experts in the fields of medicine, mental health and education and 
found significantly better performances by using additive statistical approaches. But why 
would an expert perform worse than a simple equation? And why would we continue to 
require experts when computational alternatives provide more reliable results?  
Firstly, experts are human and as such, are affected by things computers are not.  The 
argument has been made that computers will arrive at the same conclusion if the data is 
similar, whereas human experts have the ability to vary in their performance between cases 
(Newell, Lagnado, & Shanks, 2007). The variability of experts has been studied recently in a 
security context in a study by Miller, Appleby, Garibaldi, and Aickelin (2013). They 
demonstrated that a group of experts had different opinions about the prevalence of particular 
cyber threats, the ease with which cyber-attacks could be executed, and the relative cost of 
successful cyber-attacks. This research showed that there is a great deal of inter-expert and 
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intra-expert variability. Inter-expert variability may be explained by some people being ‘more 
expert’ than others. Different experts may have a preference for alternative cues that changes 
how each expert values individual cases, perhaps as a result of differing educations or 
experiences. For intra-expert variability, there are environmental factors such as time-of-day 
effects, changes in concentration, and fatigue that can alter how one expert perceives the 
same threat over time.  
Another factor that has been shown to affect an expert’s reliability is that of previous 
incidents. Norman (1991) suggests that medical diagnostics is susceptible to bias introduced 
by recent cases. If a doctor has recently diagnosed a particular disorder, they often display a 
preference to diagnose this disorder again, and this has been shown to reduce accuracy by up 
to 20%. This is powerful evidence for the presence of the Einstellung effect, or mental set, 
first found by Luchins (1942). By consistently using a particular solution to solve a problem, 
when the nature of the problem changes so that an easier and more optimal solution exists, 
participants still apply the previous solution to the point that it inhibits their ability to now 
solve new problems. Mental set has been found to increase with stressors such as time-
pressure and increased task demands (Luchins & Luchins, 1959).  
Wiley (1998) first promoted the idea that domain knowledge could act as a mental set. 
She found that domain knowledge could inhibit creative problem solving tasks when a more 
general problem-solving approach was needed. She gave participants Remote Associate tasks 
(RATs - Mednick, 1962) in which three words are given (e.g., Plate, Blue, Cottage), and 
participants must find a word that is common to all three (e.g., Cheese). Wiley compared an 
‘expert’ group that had a large amount of knowledge about baseball, with a ‘novice’ group 
that had a low amount of baseball knowledge. She found that, when a word-problem began 
with a term that had high associations with baseball (e.g., Plate), the expert group solved 
fewer RATs than the novice group that did not have this domain knowledge, showing that 
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domain knowledge can interfere with general problem solving. Bilalic, McLeod and Gobet 
(2008) studied the concept of expertise as mental set, and found that elite chess experts were 
still prone to demonstrating the Einstellung effect. Participants were presented with a series 
of chess-scenarios that had a familiar but sub-optimal move, and an optimal but unusual 
move. They found that experts often selected the sub-optimal move and reasoned that this 
was due to its familiarity gained over repeated previous exposure.  
This research on mental set is critical for the foundations for this thesis that will make 
extensive use of the theory of mental set. Not only has mental set been established to inhibit 
general problem solving, but has also been shown to expand into the real world and inhibit 
problem solving there too. Given that stressors exacerbate mental, and these stressors are 
often found in the workplace, especially in high-risk military or security settings, then it may 
be more than possible that errors in these industries result from a form of mental set. 
Wason (1960) found that participants tend to overcomplicate a relationship between 
cues when attempting to determine the relationship. He provided participants with three 
numbers (e.g., 2,4,6), and they were told the numbers followed a rule, and participants then 
had to determine what this rule was. In order to aid participants, they were allowed to 
generate number triplets themselves and given feedback on whether their triplets conformed 
to the rule or not. Although the actual rule was simple, it is reported that participants often 
neglected to identify it, instead favouring complicated and outlandish rules. This shows that 
participants who are making decisions when generating their own hypothesis tend to cling to 
the minutiae of details in the information presented, often to the detriment of the overall big 
picture. 
 
 
 25 
1.2.2  Fallibility in human decision-making 
A recurrent theme in decision-making research is that individuals often deviate from 
optimal and rational strategies or choices in systematic and measurable ways. It is widely 
believed that these deviations arise out of dual processes in reasoning. Dual process theories 
describe two systems of thinking; a heuristic ‘system 1’ process that occurs sub-consciously 
and without awareness, and an analytic ‘system 2’ process that is more complex in nature. 
Dual processes were first established by Wason and Evans (1975) after evaluating 
justification responses to the Selection Task (Wason, 1966). The selection task involved 
providing participants with a conditional sentence of the forms ‘if p then q’ or ‘if p then not-
q’.  Participants were then shown four cards; each card consisting of terms for p, not-p, q and 
not-q, and were told that each card had another term on the back of it. They were required to 
turn over the minimum number of cards needed to test the truth of the sentence.  
Wason and Evans (1975) found that participants showed a ‘matching bias’ in terms of 
selecting the cards that were mentioned in the target sentence. For example, if the sentence 
was ‘If there is a K on one side of the card, there is a 7 on the other’, on being shown four 
cards H, K, 4 and 7, participants most often chose the K and the 7. The logically correct 
response is to select K and the 4, as these are the only two cards capable of falsifying the 
sentence. However, if the sentence was ‘if there is a K on one side of the card, there is not a 7 
on the other’ then participants still showed a propensity to select the K and the 7, this time 
arriving at the correct response. Wason and Evans suggested that participants are using a 
heuristic of merely matching the terms in the sentence; this would create a correct response 
for the negation sentences, but fail to succeed on the affirmative sentences.  
In addition to selecting cards, participants were also required to justify their reasons 
for which cards were selected.  Wason and Evans found that participants attempted to 
rationalise their choices in terms of logic rather than acknowledging a matching bias. This 
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lead Wason and Evans to suggest the existence of a dual process, the selection of the cards 
was being done heuristically, the higher cognitive operation of explaining that choice being 
done analytically. More evidence of this rationalisation comes from demonstrations that 
participants will often rationalise and defend an incorrect solution even when shown 
contravening evidence (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).  
Tversky and Kahneman (1971) also describe occasions where systematic errors occur 
during judgement and decision-making. They showed that individuals do not correctly 
understand natural variation when dealing with small samples. They gave experienced 
psychologists questions about sample size and the conclusions that may be safely drawn from 
obtained data. Participants tended to ignore random sample variation in small cases and treat 
it as explainable, and a lot of descriptive narrative was attached to the initial data points.  
To explain these findings, Kahneman and Tversky (1972) introduced the heuristic of 
representativeness. Similarly to the psychologists’ errors regarding sample size, they found 
that many individuals commit errors when dealing with small samples, and that these errors 
tend to be based upon the extent to which the sample represents the population. For example, 
in a coin toss of six sequential cases, people estimate that HTHHTT (a sample with equal 
proportion of heads and tails) is more likely to occur than HHHHHT even though both 
patterns have the same probability. Kahneman and Tversky argued that this is because the 
first sample is more representative of natural frequency and thus associations are made which 
determine it more plausible to participants.  
Another systematic error was reported in Tversky and Kahneman (1973a) based 
around availability. They found that people are more likely to assign higher probability and 
estimate a higher frequency of occurrence to events or activities that are more easily recalled 
or remembered.  For example, individuals exposed to news items that contain violent imagery 
give higher estimates of crime and violence in the real world, than those that are not exposed 
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to news media of that type (Riddle, 2010). One explanation why availability, may influence 
and bias our interpretation that it is largely reliant on retrievability and imaginability 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Retrievability led to individuals to make overestimations 
about the size of a particular sample or population. For example, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973a) gave two lists to participants that contained male and female names, and participants 
had to estimate whether there were more males or females on the lists. One of the lists 
contained the names of famous and identifiable males when compared to generic female 
names, and the other list contained famous and identifiable females as compared to generic 
male names. Participants tended to estimate more of the gender that was congruent with the 
identifiable names, even though both lists contained the same number of male and female 
names. Participants committed this error because highly retrievable and salient items on that 
list were more accessible, and so participants erroneously judged them to be more common.  
The name lists created judgment errors because the names existed in participants’ 
memory, but memory is not necessary for this fallacy to occur. The bias of imaginability 
allows errors of frequency without relevant domain knowledge.  For example, the danger of 
an expedition may be judged on how many dangerous situations the participant can imagine. 
Instances where danger is available leads to overestimation of risk, but conversely, not 
considering potential likely dangers can lead to errors of underestimation. This may be true in 
our drone examples given so far. By operating in a military environment where the mission is 
to find and destroy the enemy, it may be that when given cues in the environment that suggest 
an enemy is a present, it becomes easier to imagine a group of individuals being another 
group of enemies than it is to be a wedding party – which is a rare event by comparison and 
one in which operational military personnel are not actively looking for.  
Stanovich and West (2000) coined dual processes System 1 and System 2. System 1 is 
the heuristic process, where information is considered unconsciously, implicit judgement 
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occurs, and is thought to be rapid. System 2 however is slow, deliberate, conscious, explicit 
and more analytic (Evans, 1989). Under this framework, availability, representativeness and 
matching are biases due to reliance upon system 1. Heuristics are often used in decision-
making and problem solving to appear at an intuitive conclusion. Heuristics are shortcuts that 
individuals utilise, often based on experience. They can be efficient methods of solving quick 
and routine problems that leads support to them arising as an adaptive function (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier found that use of heuristics often leads to 
ignoring some information; a judgement is arrived at without considering every available cue. 
They also found that in some circumstances this can still lead to accurate decisions where the 
burden of interpretation is low, but recognition is high. 
When it comes to anomalies, heuristics would create difficulties in successful 
interpretation of an anomalous situation, because anomalies by definition are events that 
occur at a low frequency and whose appearance is unexpected and as such, may require 
additional cues be attended to in order to distinguish it from a separate event.  
The availability heuristic predicts poor anomaly handling performance in practical 
settings. For example, a power plant has a malfunction detected through irregular sensor data 
(e.g., high temperature) anomalous and indicative of a threat. In this scenario, engineers must 
diagnose and rectify the problem. An increase in temperature is most frequently associated 
with using the wrong type of fuel. An engineer faced by this problem may attempt to 
diagnose the rise in temperature by generating hypotheses relating to fuel consumption as this 
is the most available explanation. An engineer familiar with this specific plant may be aware 
of a faulty section of pipeline that regularly bursts, leaking water necessary for cooling the 
system, and so a rise in temperature in one area may be due to a coolant leak in another area. 
The engineer that focuses upon fuel-centric solutions may never generate the correct 
hypothesis about the pipe without exposure to alternative relationships between the values 
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and variables in this example. 
The impact of an availability heuristic is explored in the present study of anomaly 
handling, by examining how the frequency of a particular problem solution can bias solution 
choice when choosing from a sample of pre-selected hypotheses. For example, in our 
engineer example, while it would not be satisfactory to have novices innovate the notion of a 
broken coolant pipe when they have minimal knowledge of that domain, instead it would be 
better to provide potential participants with a number of solution hypotheses, including 
hypotheses based on fuel-type, but also including the broken pipe. This allows us to see under 
what conditions participants still commit decision errors when solution generation is not a 
barrier to success.  
The representativeness heuristic is also important in the successful handling of 
anomalies, as it is important in determining that an event is indeed anomalous. If individuals 
are used to seeing or interpreting an environment in a particular way, then subtle yet critical 
changes in this environment may prove hard to detect as the anomalous environment may be 
more representative of an anomaly-free environment.  
In order to examine the process of anomaly handling, a paradigm must be generated 
in which successful interpretation differs from a failed one, and must also maintain a 
mechanism that allows us to detect the use of inappropriate heuristics. Our system (described 
in more detail in Chapter 2) comprises a variable that represents the supply of a resource 
distributed around a number of nodes, and the distribution of that variable is determined by 
other factors. The system is one of intelligence in a conflict setting; supply of weapons act as 
the resource variable, different population zones act as the nodes, and local environmental 
conditions determine the available supply and distribution of the weapons. In this case, it is 
‘normal’ to have weapons distributed equally to all zones, and an accumulation of weapons in 
one zone suggests an anomalous event.  One common interpretation of this accumulation of 
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weapons is that a conflict is impending. It is the job of the intelligence analyst to detect the 
changes in supply that suggest conflict. The representativeness heuristic can be examined by 
the introduction of anomalies, these would be fundamentally different events occurring 
within the simulation, but that appear similar to a conflict. In principal, this will mimic the 
difference in our drone example, between a meeting of insurgents and a wedding party, two 
events that appear similar enough to fit the description of a ‘signature strike’ yet result from 
two extremely different causes. In an example from our system, adverse weather conditions 
may conspire to prevent delivery of weapons to particular locations, where the surplus is then 
redirected to remaining accessible locations, this combination of events then results in a 
weapons distribution that looks like an impending attack. In this case the correct solution 
would not be one of identifying an attack, but by using additional (and perhaps often 
ignorable) information, perhaps through system 2 reasoning, to determine the true cause of 
the event.  
The system used in the current research is essentially a causal reasoning task. The 
user must determine the cause of the resulting distribution as either hostile (weapons 
stockpiling for impending attack) or no threat (weapons surplus due to supply-side issues) 
based on the input of the system, as the outcomes of both may appear identical. 
 
1.3 From laboratory to field – Human involvement in anomaly handling  
1.3.1 Anomalies in naturalistic environments 
Despite the importance of determining fundamental factors that underpin success in 
anomaly handling tasks in the laboratory, it still remains our aim to explain how this process 
can be important in understanding performance in naturalistic environments. Anomalies are 
often indicative of an undetected fault or threat, and by successfully interpreting these 
accurately and quickly it may be possible to mitigate potential damage to the systems in 
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which these anomalies are experienced. Research suggests that human error plays a large role 
in the failure to detect anomalies in industry. It has been estimated that between 70-80% of 
incidents in high-risk industry occur due to human error (Reason, 1990). With the 
consequences of such incidents being potentially catastrophic, the role of this human error 
has provided an attractive topic of psychological investigation. Sneddon, Mearns and Flin 
(2006) conducted research into the cause of such potentially catastrophic incidents on 
offshore oilrigs and found that attention was a large cause of human error. In this industry, 
incidents can accrue huge loss of life, large monetary damage to assets, and grave harm to the 
environment (Cullen, 1990). Another significant conclusion of Sneddon et al.’s work was that 
a critical component of human error was a poor understanding or conceptualisation of the 
workspace.  
The dangers of a poor understanding of the workspace can manifest into potential 
incidents in a number of ways. For example, poor conceptualisation of a problem could lead 
to inefficient decision-making that fails to provide an adequate solution to deal with a target 
problem. Alternatively, if the environment in which a problem is encountered is poorly 
understood then it could be that anomalies in the workspace are not attended to, or noticed as 
being indicative of a threat, and do not become a recognised danger. As Klayman (1988) 
noted with respect to cue identification, if a work environment is poorly understood, then an 
individual’s ability to determine useful cues from that environment is compromised.  
A good example of the latter is the case of the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island in 
the United States in 1979. The incident developed when a valve malfunctioned, and failed to 
close as it should have done. Although the problem was mechanical in nature, there were a 
series of human errors that exacerbated the situation. According to an official Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission report (Rogivin, 1980) the fault with the valve was not discovered 
by the operators for hours after the malfunction. This was due to two main reasons; the first 
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was that operators believed a signal on the control panel told them that the valve was closed. 
In fact the signal actually represented a different but proximate mechanical component, and 
over time, operators had habitually incorporated the function of this component as a proxy 
measure for the state of the valve. Second, additional information available to the operators 
such as temperatures and pressures at various parts in the system would have been diagnostic 
of the open valve; however, because no problem was thought to exist, this was not attended 
to. It could be argued that both of these failures in human reasoning arose out of a poorly 
understood conceptualisation of the workspace. If the operators had better understood the 
roles of the signals, then they may have not ruled out a problem with the valve. If they had 
attended to the anomalous additional information, then they may also have realised the 
presence of a problem.  
So why couldn’t the operators at Three Mile Island diagnose the problem? The simple 
answer was that they didn’t realise a problem was occurring. Smith (1989) differentiates 
problem identification from problem detection. Problem identification is the series of 
behaviours or cognitive processes that are executed when a problem exists, and the cause is 
aimed to be determined. Problem detection is the arousal of a suspicion that something may 
be wrong with a system that deviates from its normal state of operation, which then allows 
problem identification to occur. Whilst the Three Mile Island operators would have no doubt 
been able to diagnose the problem if tasked to, their belief that the plant was operationally 
functional meant they had no need to. This is a case of a failure of problem detection. 
Problem detection was first described by Cowen (1986), who provided a rudimentary 
explanation as to how it occurred. Cowen believed that problems were detected when 
variations between what was happening and what we want to happen accumulate to pass a 
particular threshold that allows us to notice something is not optimal. Whilst this 
discrepancy-accumulation model was the first to tackle problem detection, and provides one 
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route where problem detection may occur, it fails to provide a fully substantiated model that 
accounts for all instances of problem detection.  
The issue of problem detection was further explored by Klein, Pliske, Crandall and 
Woods (2005). They attempted to create a framework of problem detection in a more flexible 
manner than Cowen’s discrepancy accumulation model. They elaborate on a number of cases 
of critical incident decision-making where the problem detection itself was a prominent 
feature. By using exemplar cases, they show that Cowen’s model is not enough to account for 
problem detection. One exemplar case in question comes from an experienced paediatric 
nurse who immediately noticed something wrong with an infant and followed it up, ending in 
the successful diagnosis of a problem when the same symptoms were available to a lesser 
experienced nurse who failed to detect the problem (Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993). The 
case shows that problem detection need not be an accumulation of discrepancies, as the nurse 
noticed a problem immediately. Also, it shows that an element of expertise and experience 
must be accounted for in problem detection, as the exact same information had been non-
indicative of a problem to a more junior member of nursing staff.  
Klein et al. (2005) argue for two additions to the discrepancy-accumulation model. 
First, a discrepancy is a violation of expectation rather than a deviance from a goal state. This 
addition provides an explanation as to how individuals of differing experience can have 
differences in ability to detect problems, as their expectations alter with expertise and allow a 
finer resolution with which to detect problems. For example, in the nurse exemplar above, 
while the junior nurse may know that the colour of baby is indicative of its health (blue is 
unhealthy, pink is healthy), the senior nurse has a higher sensitivity and can better 
discriminate at what point the baby’s colour indicates a problem. The second change is that 
accumulation is not necessary, as single salient cues may be enough to trigger problem 
detection, and also a number of discrepancies can be explained away that do not result in 
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problem detection.  
Problem detection is important for anomaly handling, because some anomalies may 
appear similar to a normal situation, and in order to interpret these anomalies successfully, 
the observer must first differentiate that a change has occurred. The nature of problem 
detection was incorporated into our simulation. This was possible by making some problems 
solvable using a single cue with different characteristics. Our anomalies were then created to 
have similar characteristics to these distinctive cues, but where this information must be 
combined with another cue to successfully solve. If our decision-makers are using heuristics 
for the majority of problems (which are not anomalies) then problem detection will become 
an issue for anomaly handling. This should be reflected in reduced participant performance 
on our task. 
Klein (1989; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood & Zsambok, 1993) described problem 
detection in his Recognition Primed Decision Making model (RPDM). RPDM is 
characterised by comparing a new problem to an internal repertoire of previously encountered 
problems in order to classify and arrange a suitable response to an emergent problem. The 
RPDM model works on a series of problem reconceptualisations that arise when an 
expectation is violated. Expertise in the nurse exemplar, above, may come from either 
recognition of the problem from having experienced similar cases previously, or from a 
violation of the expectation that the child is healthy as the child did not match examples of 
previously identified healthy babies. The more junior nurse was not able to detect the 
problem perhaps because she had never encountered this particular set of symptoms as so 
could not recognise it as a trajectory to serious illness. 
When it comes to successful interpretation of anomalies or discrepancies, the RPDM 
may not be capable of such a task, which could result in the failure to solve a problem when 
the problem looks like previously encountered problems. For example, RPDM works off a 
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library of previous experiences that offers a repertoire of signs, symptoms, classifications and 
solutions. If a problem has not been seen before, then it may still be anomalous enough to 
arouse suspicion and violate expectation, but it will not trigger any of the cues to stored 
solution knowledge.  If we classify the functionality of a system and possible problems based 
on a library of prior experience, then we do not allow room for innovation, and may even 
encourage fixation on non-optimal decision paths (De Keyser & Woods, 1993). For example, 
if operators at Three Mile Island had noticed that a signal was present that previously had 
meant the plant was functioning as expected then there would be no reason to attempt to 
innovate a solution to the problem of detecting the open valve. 
A review of problem detection (Klein et. al. 2005) suggested a role for sense-making 
in the ability to interpret anomalies. They explain that anomalies are actually frequent events 
in many industries, and that deviation alone is not enough to classify a problem. Instead, we 
have a conceptualisation of the workspace that can be used to explain away anomalies. If a 
particular conceptualisation doesn’t explain the anomalies, then a new conceptualisation is 
recreated, until all anomalies are accounted for and there is no longer a problem.  
Sense-making is elaborated in the data-frame model (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 
2006). In this model, the individual possesses a starting state based upon the data available to 
them. A ‘frame’ is constructed which fits these data and acts as the individual’s 
conceptualisation of the workspace. As data change in real-time, a frame may be 
compromised when anomalies are introduced – the individual may try and preserve the frame 
by tracking the anomalies, detecting further inconsistencies, or judging the plausibility or 
quality of the data. The frame can then be elaborated and questioned, new data can be sought 
out and inferences can be drawn upon newly discovered relationships in the data. This ends 
with a reframing of the workspace, that encompasses all of the previous anomalies and thus 
removing them from the new frame (Klein, Philips, Rall, & Peluso, 2007). To put this into 
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context, we can return to our opening example of drone strikes. When an operator is 
assessing surveillance materials, they possess a ‘frame’ of their workspace in which they are 
looking for hostiles, when the operator comes across a large group of males this may be 
consistent with that frame. By further monitoring the group, the operator may track those 
individuals trekking cross-country without weapons. The lack of weapons may be unusual in 
this case, and be incompatible with the ‘frame’ that these people are insurgents. As such, the 
operators frame adjusts to incorporate this new information. Perhaps the group is travelling 
unarmed to avoid suspicion of ground forces, perhaps the weapons are concealed, or perhaps 
the group are not hostiles at all. The operators ‘frame’ switches to one in which the group 
may or may not be hostile. Continued monitoring of the group shows that they turn up at a 
religious building where traditional marriage clothing can now be seen on the individuals, 
and a ceremony takes place. The operators ‘frame’ now shifts again to one in which the 
operator understands that what they are viewing is a wedding and not a group of hostiles, and 
so no strike is conducted.  
The addition of sense-making to anomaly handling enriches accounts of the causes of 
human error (Sneddon, Mearns, & Flin, 2006). A poorly conceptualised workspace may be 
the cause of human error because of a lack of successful sense-making. Support for this idea 
comes from research by Malakis and Kontogiannis (2012), who found that highly salient 
concepts of successful problem detection in air traffic controllers had significant overlap with 
traditional concepts in sense-making such as situational awareness.  
Many studies looking at problem detection in particular domains have been conducted 
examining interview responses gained after using the critical decision method of cognitive 
task analysis (Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989; Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 
1998) and then trawled for examples when problem detection was a main feature of the 
critical incident. Research has also been done on problem detection in a naturalistic setting. 
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For example, Mumaw, Roth, Vicente and Burns (2000) conducted naturalistic observations 
inside a nuclear power plant. Rather than examining historical critical incidents and looking 
for occasions when detection was flagged as a prominent feature (which must be vulnerable 
to issues involving memory), Mumaw et al. conducted observations while the power plant 
was in a functionally operational condition. This allowed real-time monitoring of problem 
detection as it occurred. It also allowed conclusions about the vigilance, strategies and 
procedures that staff used before the problems were detected.  
Findings from both Mumaw et al. (2000) and Klein et al. (2005) converge on similar 
issues surrounding problem detection. Research from multiple domains has shown that the 
ability to interpret anomalies is not a task that occurs independently from the ability to detect 
anomalies. Nor is the conceptualisation or framing of a workspace a task that is accomplished 
easily. Both findings show that problem detection usually arises out of the presence of 
anomalies. But industry often requires the individuals to function in an environment where 
anomalies are commonplace. Mumaw et al. (2000) observed that for power plant operators, 
signals often came in the form of alarms, and that there were a vast amount of signals that 
each operator was responsible for. When monitoring the operational functionality of the 
power plant, many alarms would sound, some continuously. So the issue isn’t how to detect 
these alarms from a stable, functional state, but how to interpret patterns of anomalies that 
could lead to potentially critical incidents from a noisy and anomaly filled background. The 
process of problem detection goes more than just a violation of expectation, but becomes a 
process of anomaly handling. 
We use the term anomaly handling for the approach by which information is 
processed by decision makers in the detection, identification and resolution of potential 
problems, specifically when those problems present with a similar appearance to routine 
problems that are more frequent and require a different solution. So while problem detection 
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is a feature of anomaly handling, the latter also encompasses the ability to infer the health of 
a system from those initial anomalies.  
While this research summarises that people are capable of identifying and tending to 
anomalies, it does nothing to determine the condition, factors and boundaries at which 
success can be achieved. Post-hoc descriptions of a decision are excellent ways to create 
frameworks that describe this process, but to understand the limits of human anomaly 
handling it would be more appropriate to create a paradigm that can be utilised under 
laboratory conditions, yet simulates a real world experience. This way, it is possible to 
manipulate factors and better understand the conditions that lead to anomaly-handling 
success. 
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2 Developing a simulation for exploring anomaly handling 
2.1 An introduction to the experimental paradigm 
2.1.1 Overview and goal of the simulation 
In order to develop a simulation to explore decision-making in a controlled but realistic 
way, a simulated environment was designed to be simple enough to allow individuals to 
understand the context of the environment and to be able to form expectations and create 
predictions of how the system would behave. The psychological literature on cues, their 
acquisition from an information environment, and the limits to which experience would not 
inhibit performance were all taken into consideration during the development of the task. As 
a direct result of this research, the design was informed by this previous research in a number 
of ways. First, the number of available cues was limited so as to give novices an ability to 
comprehend and participate without memory or domain knowledge acting as a barrier to 
performance. Second, the paradigm was designed so that solutions to some types of problem 
would heavily favour a single cue more than other cues. This was to create an optimum 
environment in which participants may develop heuristic strategies by placing a heavier 
weighting or importance on a single cue. As an extension to this, a set of problems 
(representing out anomalies) were designed in such a way that reliance on a single cue for 
solution generation would create a tell-tale series of errors that would identify the use of such 
heuristic strategies. 
 The chosen paradigm had to be based upon a relatively simple rule-set to be accessible 
to naïve participants, yet be sophisticated enough to allow complex interactions within the 
system to arise, these complex interactions will represent our anomalies.  
 The context chosen for our environment was that of intelligence analysis within a 
conflict setting, where each participant would play the role of an intelligence analyst. The 
simulation represents the security picture within a fictional country. The objective of the 
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participant is to make a security assessment about the state of the country. During the 
simulation, weapons flow between different locations and participants will have to determine 
the underlying reasons for the movement of weapons. The simulation offers two possible 
explanations for changes in arms traffic; this is either due to an impending conflict within the 
country, or because the supply of arms is being affected by the environmental conditions. 
Participants will have to use multiple information channels within the simulation to decide 
which explanation better fits the data available to them.  
 
2.1.2 Information available within the simulation 
 Within the simulation, participants have access to a map of the country. Marked on 
the map are four different zones. Also on the map are the known supply routes by which arms 
are trafficked into each zone. Finally, the map also contains the types of environmental 
hazards that each supply route must cross. This map and all relevant information can be seen 
in Figure 1. While a number of trials will be given to each participant, the map remains 
consistent throughout the experiment. A trial consists of two sets of data representing weapon 
volumes and environmental conditions. 
 
Figure 2.1. Map of zones, supply routes, and environmental hazards used in the simulation. 
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Within the map, four zones can be found, labelled A-D. Red lines represent the supply routes 
by which arms are trafficked into each zone. The map also contains the type of environmental 
hazards, with a unique icon for each type of hazard. The types of hazard are mountains , 
underground tunnel ,  and a river . 
Each participant also has access to two tables of information. These tables represent the 
number of weapons in each zone and the local environmental conditions, each over five time-
points. Examples of these can be found in Figure 2 below. Each trial consisted of one table of 
each type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Examples of weapon information (left), and environmental information (right) 
 
Within the simulation, each environmental condition is related to an environmental hazard. A 
reminder of this information is also contained within the simulation to not make memory a 
reason for failure, see Figure 3 below. The interactions between environmental conditions 
and hazards will be explained further in the technical section. 
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Figure 2.3. Reminder of environmental / hazard interactions available throughout 
experiment.  
 
Finally, the last object within the simulation was an on-screen prompt that captured the 
decision of the participant. This was an on-screen box that relayed the options to the 
participant, alongside a description of which key to press for each option (Figure 4.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Decision box, explains which key to use to register each possible outcome.  
 
When combining each of these elements together, Figure 5 shows a typical representation of 
a single trial, and what a participant sees within the simulation. Between trials, only the two 
tables containing data would change. 
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Figure 2.5. Typical representation of a single trial within the simulation. 
 
2.2 Technical rules overview  
2.2.1 Environmental events 
 Within the simulation a number of environmental events are possible. Each 
environmental event is represented by a rapid change in a corresponding environmental 
variable. An increase in rainfall will flood the river, a decrease in temperature causes the 
mountain pass to freeze, and an increase in Richter scale recordings is indicative of recent 
earthquakes that collapse underground tunnels. A reminder of these interactions is present 
within the simulation at all times for participants to access. It is possible to determine which 
zones are affected by each event, by examining which supply routes cross affected hazards. If 
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a supply route crosses a hazard that has been negatively affected, that supply route is deemed 
treacherous. Treacherous supply routes are only capable of delivering half (50%) of the 
normal supply of weapons. All undelivered arms due to treacherous supply routes are 
distributed across all remaining non-treacherous, safe supply routes. For an illustrated 
example of this, please see Figure 6 below. 
Figure 2.6. Example of normal (left) and treacherous (right) temperature data and 
distribution   
 
To deliver arms to Zone A, the mountain must be crossed (as indicated by the red supply line 
going to Zone A crossing the icon that represents the mountain). It is explained that low 
temperatures will affect the mountain. In the above example, on the left the temperature 
remains normal over the five time-points, and the weapons can be supplied as the hazard is 
not treacherous. This leads to a ‘normal’ amount of weapons being delivered to Zone A, and 
none are redistributed (as indicated in Figure 6 by 100% supply to Zone A and 0% return 
rate. In the example on the right, we have an extreme drop in temperature over time, from 15 
to -22 degrees Celsius; this makes the mountain treacherous. As a result, only half (50%) of 
the weapons can get through to Zone A. The remainder (50%) are sent back for redistribution 
to other non-treacherous zones (not pictured here) assuming all other zones are safe, these 
weapons would then be supplied to Zones B, C and D alongside their normal supply, 
increasing weapons supplied in these other zones 
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Changes in distribution of weapons can be monitored in the numeric weapons table. 
At the start of the simulation, the distribution of weapons across all nodes is equal. Each node 
receives the same number of weapons and this distribution is consistent over time. This 
number only changes when supply routes are being affected by environmental events, or in 
the case of a conflict. If there are no environmental events, the distribution of weapons will 
remain equal across all time-points. Figure 7 is an example of a ‘no change’ weapons 
distribution where no events are present. It is important to note that even in the ‘no change’ 
trials, there is some small variation between time periods (time data is vertical, top is the 
earliest data, with the bottom row representing the most recent). However, these small 
changes are not large enough to constitute an event, either environmental or conflict. 
Figure 2.7. Example of a ‘no change’ weapons distribution. 
If there are environmental events, the distribution of weapons changes to reflect the 
rules above on treacherous hazards. This results in the number of weapons decreasing in 
zones using treacherous supply routes, and increasing in all remaining zones. In this case, the 
presence of environmental events drives the change in weapons distribution in a causal 
manner. An example of this may be seen in an extension of our earlier example of the 
treacherous mountain. If the mountain is treacherous (which must be crossed to supply Zone 
A), then Zone A will only receive 50% of its intended weapons, with the remaining amount 
being redistributed. An example weapon table for this can be found below in Figure 8. 
 46 
Figure 2.8. If the mountain was to become treacherous, the above weapons 
distribution would be seen. Note that weapons in Zone A have reduced over time to half of the 
original number. The remainder of this is then split between all remaining safe Zones. This 
assumes that all other zones are not treacherous.  
A further example of how environmental conditions affects weapons supply can be 
seen in Figure 9. In this example, we can assume the rainfall has critically increased. We 
know that this will make the river treacherous. As per the map, the river must be crossed to 
supply Zone C and Zone D. The result is that weapon volume is Zone C and Zone D reduces 
to half its original number, and that the difference can be found in the increases to Zone A 
and Zone B.  
Figure 2.9. Example of a weapon distribution table in the result of a flooded river. 
When the changes in weapons can be fully explained by the presence of environmental events 
then the system state is one where there is no threat, and the changes in arms traffic is due to 
the environment. This is not indicative of a conflict.  
 
2.2.2 Conflict events 
Conflict events are a separate type of event that is distinct from environmental events. 
Similar to the environmental event, the presence of a conflict affects the supply of weapons to 
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zones. However, unlike environmental events, there is no indicator that states the presence or 
absence of a conflict, and this event must be inferred from the distribution of weapons 
combined with the absence of appropriate environment conditions to account for the resultant 
distribution. If there is a conflict, rules state that the weapons distributed to all non-conflict 
zones is decreased by half (50%), creating a surplus to be redistributed to the conflict zone. 
See figure 10 below for an example of a conflict seen via the weapon distribution table and 
the environmental conditions. 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Data tables for a conflict. The weapons data (left) shows a large increase 
in Zone B, and all other zones have reduced by 50%. The environmental data (right) shows 
no significant changes that would trigger a hazard. With the lack of environmental 
explanation, the change in weapons must be due to a conflict in Zone B.  
 
A conflict event creates a large increase in weapons in the zone of origin, and lowers 
the number of weapons available across all other zones. Environmental events differ by 
creating a decrease in the number of weapons available to zones that are deemed treacherous 
(assigned by the supply route crossing an affected hazard), and providing all non-treacherous 
zones with an increase that is dependent upon the number of treacherous zones.  It should be 
noted that the increase in weapons caused by a conflict event is always greater than those 
caused by a single environmental event. 
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2.2.3 Adding complexity 
The previous examples outline the simple distribution changes that conflict and 
environmental events incur. These are the simpler problems. High solution rates on these 
problems show that participants understand the rules enough to engage in the simulation. To 
reflect the nature of these problems, they have been named; no event, simple environmental 
event, and simple conflict event respectively. In each of these, there is either no event, or one 
event occurring at any given time, making the distribution follow the rules clearly. 
There are two types of problem that are special instances and represent a more 
challenging problem that requires additional inferences to be made before solving correctly. 
These two problem types are complex conflict events, and complex environmental events. 
Complex conflict events problems possess a conflict event, and an environmental event that 
affects non-conflict zones. In this problem, there are cues for both the conflict system state, 
and the environmental system state. However, the environmental cues are not relevant and 
the distribution can only be explained by the conflict event, as an environmental event alone 
cannot cause the level of change observed. An example of this can be found in Figure 11 
below where the weapons table (left) shows a large increase in Zone B, and decreases in all 
other Zones. However, there is still activity in the environment table (right) where we can see 
a large increase in rainfall. This would flood the river, and makes Zone C and D treacherous. 
However, if rainfall were the only event, both Zones A and B would increase, whereas Zone 
A has seen a reduction. The only explanation based on the supply rules given is that there is a 
conflict in Zone B at the same time as an environmental event. This will also explain why 
Zones C and C are lower than Zone A. Zones A, B and C have reduced as a result of the 
conflict in B, and Zones C and D have reduced even further due to the treacherous hazard. In 
the role of intelligence analyst, participants are told their primary function is to identify and 
spot conflicts. In cases where there is both an environmental event, and a conflict, 
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participants are told that identifying the conflict takes priority – and so stating there is a threat 
due to conflict is the correct answer. 
 
Figure 2.11. Example weapons and environmental tables from a complex conflict 
event 
 
The second complex problem is the complex environmental event. In these problems 
there are two environmental events. These two events block three of the four possible supply 
routes. This causes a 50% decrease in each blocked zone, with a resulting 150% increase in 
the only remaining zone with safe supply routes. While this change can be explained by the 
environmental events, the final weapon distribution is identical to those of the simple conflict 
event problems. In this case, evidence for both conflict and environmental system states are 
present, but the changes observed are not large enough to meet the criteria if a conflict were 
also present, leaving the environmental event as the only possible correct solution. Figure 12 
shows example data tables of this scenario below. In this example, the weapons table (left) 
shows a large single increase in Zone B, and all other zones have reduced by half. This 
matches the type of data seen in a simple conflict event, however, when we examine the 
environmental table (right), we can see there are two environmental events occurring 
simultaneously. The low temperature would create a hazard in the mountain, effecting Zone 
A, and the high rainfall would create a hazard in the river, effecting Zones C and D. In this 
case, Zones A, C and D are all treacherous. Following the supply rules set out, treacherous 
routes have their supply halved, with the remainder evenly divided among all remaining non-
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treacherous zones. In this case, Zone B is the only non-treacherous zone and so receives all of 
the surplus weapons itself. This example can be fully explained by the presence of 
environmental events only, and so no threat needs to be recorded. 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Example data tables of a complex environmental event 
Instructions given on the explanation and rules of how the task is to be completed can be 
found in Appendix 1.  
 
2.2.4 Inferences 
During this task, there are a number of inferences that must be made for the 
participant to achieve the correct solution. These inferences can be divided into two phases. 
In the first phase, the participant must identify any potential treacherous hazards caused by 
the environmental conditions. Participants are told that rapid change in environmental 
variables cause environmental events which make hazards treacherous. Participants must 
make judgements as to which point conditions become critical. Rainfall is normally 0-10mm, 
but rises to 70 when critical. Temperature is normally 10-20C but drops to -20C when 
critical. Richter values are normally 2-3, and rise to 6 when critical. While the temperature 
and rainfall metrics represent a distinct change over a larger range of values, the Richter scale 
is much more sensitive with a shorter range of values, and participants will need to learn to 
understand the difference between these ranges to successfully understand the causes of each 
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different environmental event. Environmental events can be inferred by observing the critical 
threshold values being exceeded. To help establish these thresholds, environmental events 
create extremely distinctive weapon distribution profiles that can only be associated with a 
particular metric. For example, at the introduction of the first environmental event caused by 
an increase in Richter value, the weapon distribution changes so that collapsed underground 
tunnels are the only possible explanation. At this point, participants can establish a baseline 
for what an exceeded threshold looks like for that variable.  
Once participants have inferred the state of the hazards from the environmental 
conditions, a second inference must be made about how that is expected to change the 
distribution of weapons. If we assume that there is no error in the ability to determine the 
presence of treacherous hazards, then distributions should behave accordingly when 
experiencing each of these events. Table 2 summarises the weapon distribution changes for 
all possible combinations of environmental and conflict events.  
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Table 2. List of possible scenario events for both complexity (simple and complex) 
and event type (environmental and conflict) showing their resulting change in 
weapons distribution in each zone. 
 Event Treacherous  ΔA ΔB ΔC ΔD 
Simple  Low temp A -50% +17% +17 +17% 
 High rain CD +50% +50% -50% -50% 
 Seismic BD +50% -50% +50% -50% 
 Conflict A -- +150% -50% -50% -50% 
 Conflict B -- -50% +150% -50% -50% 
 Conflict C -- -50% -50% +150% -50% 
 Conflict D -- -50% -50% -50% +150% 
Complex Low temp + high rain ACD -50% +150% -50% -50% 
 Low temp + seismic ABD -50% -50% +150% -50% 
 High rain + seismic BCD +150% -50% -50% -50% 
 Conflict A + high rain BCD +200% -50% -75% -75% 
 Conflict A + seismic BCD +200% -75% -50% -75% 
 Conflict B + high rain ACD -50% +200% -75% -75% 
 Conflict B + low temp ACD -75% +175% -50% -50% 
 Conflict C + low temp ABD -75% -50% +175% -50% 
 Conflict C + seismic ABD -50% -75% +200% -75% 
 Conflict D + low temp ABC -75% -50% -50% +175% 
 
Each event and combination of events has unique profile except those of the simple 
conflict events and the complex environmental event. These two problem types have identical 
distribution profiles but can still be solved correctly. The complex environmental events will 
have the appropriate environmental metrics exceed their critical threshold, whereas the 
simple conflict events have normal environmental data. It may be expected that the two may 
be incorrectly identified if participants use heuristics to complete the assessment based on the 
weapons data alone. However, this misattribution bears no basis in logic. For example, the 
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complex environmental event of Low temp + high rain creates treacherous hazards between 
zones A,C, and D, creating a weapons distribution similar to a conflict in Zone B. It is 
expected that participants may fail to identify this difference and incorrectly select a conflict 
event as the solution if they are not using logical reasoning, and are instead using heuristics. 
The table below demonstrates why that cannot be the case. If a conflict in B were to occur at 
the same time as the environmental events, then the change we see should be much more 
pronounced. It is not, and so there cannot be a conflict occurring at this time. This leaves the 
only remaining cause of the observed change to be caused by the environmental conditions.  
 
Table 3. Table showing similarity in weapon distribution of simple conflict and complex 
environmental problem types with additional outcome for both combined. 
 Event Blocked  ΔA ΔB ΔC ΔD 
Simple 
Conflict 
Conflict B  ACD -50% +150% -50% -50% 
Complex 
Environmental 
Low temp + 
high rain 
ACD -50% +150% -50% -50% 
Complex 
Environmental 
+ Conflict 
Low temp + 
high rain + 
conflict B 
ACD -75% +225% -75% -75% 
 
Similarly, it is possible to theorise that participants may mistakenly categorise the 
complex conflict events as environmental events. While it is true that an environmental event 
is occurring, it is not possible for this event alone to be the cause of the observed change, and 
can only be explained by the presence of a conflict. Because of these interactions it is 
possible for each scenario to have a conclusive correct answer that can be determined from 
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the data being provided, while at the same time leaving room for systematic errors to be made 
if participants use heuristics in the form of reducing the number of cues they use, or rely on 
recognition-based pattern-matching.  
2.3  The use of simulations in psychological research 
Decision-making researchers have often used simulations to explore specific domains.  
For example, Hilburn, Jorna, Byrne, and Parasuraman (1997) studied the decision-making 
skills used by air traffic controllers in a simulation of an air-traffic control (ATC) workspace. 
The information available mirrored the type of information output to actual ATC displays. 
The method of problem-solving was also as similar to the actual job, including the response 
options available to the participants, who were experienced air traffic controllers. The aim of 
the research was to gain quantitative information about how ATC controllers organise, 
construct, and carry out their decisions. Similarly, Omodei and Wearing (1995) created Fire 
Chief, a simulation of a firefighting command response system to assess the structure of 
decisions made by fire commanders as to where to deploy available resources. Although this 
simulation was more abstract than Hilburn, et al. (1997), the information used to inform each 
decision, such as the location of a fire, the size of a fire, and current weather trends were all 
available, mirroring the critical information available in the real world, alongside realistic 
response options. 
A review of simulations used to conduct psychological research was carried out by 
Gonzalez, Vanyukov and Martin (2005), who found that simulations, such as Omodei and 
Wearing’s FireChief, are rated high enough in terms of complexity and fidelity that they are 
to be considered a powerful tool in the study of complex decision making. They argue that 
such simulations allow researchers to collect quantitative data regarding performance that 
may remain undetected with qualitative research methods such as naturalistic decision 
making, and that they are a middle ground between laboratory studies where task 
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performance is often not indicative of expertise, and field studies, whose research methods do 
not allow a degree of experimental control. 
In both Omodei and Wearing’s Fire Chief and Hilburn et al.’s ATC scenario, the 
simulations are used to create environments for studying decision-making that attempt to be 
an accurate reflection of real systems in order to better account for real-world experience. In 
such systems, an experienced participant is expected to perform better than a novice because 
they can rely on their domain knowledge and strategic experience to formulate a response 
that will lead to a predictably better outcome. For example, Johnson et al. (2014) examined 
the decisions to use deadly force in a shoot/no-shoot task within a simulated video 
environment, comparing military personal and police officers, and novices, who had no 
formal deadly force training. They found that experts were more likely to make a correct 
decision to use deadly force than novices. The simulation was of sufficient fidelity to 
facilitate transfer of real world experience, and captured performance differences between 
individuals of different ability.  
 The critical factors of a simulation that allow it to be used successfully for 
psychological research are fidelity and complexity. A simulation must have a high fidelity to 
the situation in which it is trying to mimic. This includes having the same critical information 
available, and replicating the same environments that are possible with the real task. This is 
to allow the transfer of skills and knowledge from the real environment to the simulation. If 
the simulation is not high enough in fidelity, then an expert in the real world would need to 
‘re-learn’ the simulation as their skills and experience would not carry over. For example, one 
prolific use of simulations for psychological research is that of driving performance, such as 
the effect of emotional phone conversations on driving (Briggs, Hole, & Land, 2011). In 
driving simulators, not every detail needs to be the same as in a real car. For example, many 
driving simulators used in psychological research will not have foot pedals or a steering 
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wheel. In these experiments, the most important part of the task is what a driver can see – and 
so the simulators cater to creating a visual experience similar to real driving. As such, our 
simulator includes only those aspects of military intelligence required for the task assessment 
to be conducted with certainty. These are the combined elements of our simulation including 
the geography, and the data streams.  
The second element for a good simulator is that of complexity. The more complex a 
simulator is then the more situations it is capable of handling, and the more nuanced results 
any input can have. The two elements of complexity and fidelity go together, with an increase 
in complexity usually facilitating a higher fidelity. For example, in Omodei and Wearing’s 
Fire Chief, although it was a computerised simulation for fire control, the behaviour of the 
simulated fire itself was complex enough to allow the users to input a large array of responses 
into the simulation and still have it model the impact on the simulated fire, while taking place 
in an abstract computerised task.  
For our task, we are only interested in our participant’s ability to determine between 
two separate pre-defined system states; threat detected or no threat detected. As such, the way 
the simulation combines the available data must be complex enough to create a challenge. 
The simulation used in this research has been discussed at scientific advisory 
committees within the industry of security and defence and has been judged to be an 
acceptable standard for further psychological testing. 
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3 Experiment 1: Initial performance evaluation 
3.1 Introduction 
This experiment set out to evaluate the success of the simulation described in Chapter 
2 as a decision-making paradigm under which anomaly handling can be examined. The task 
was one of hypothesis selection within a simulated intelligence-analysis environment. By 
creating low-frequency problems (anomalies) whose defining characteristics are similar to 
those of more frequent problems yet have distinct separate causal origins, it is possible to 
investigate an individual’s ability to determine the difference between these problem types, 
and gain insight into the strategies used. Anomalous problems involved cases where the 
outcome contains cues that usually associate with the opposite position, for example, a no-
threat system contains indicators usually indicative of a threat (complex environmental events 
that possess the weapon distribution of a conflict), or a threat system that contains indicators 
usually associated with no-threat (presence of environmental event). By creating such 
problems, it is possible to examine the degree of understanding the participant have of the 
problem-space and examine their underlying assumptions that represent their view of the 
relationships between objects in an environment. If a participant was drawing inferences set 
out in the rules and used a logical system of problem-solving, solution rates would be high. 
However, if heuristics are being used, then particular patterns of systematic error would 
indicate particular strategies. 
Based upon the literature forming the recognition-primed decision making (RPDM: 
Klein et al., 2005) framework, we would expect four types of behaviour from participants in 
regards to strategies, each creating detectable signature in which errors are made: 
1) The participant is using deductive reasoning to create inferences based upon the 
logical rules provided, this should result in no errors; 
2) The participant is using a heuristic approach that dictates group membership of a 
 58 
case based upon similarity to previous cases. This is a type of pattern-matching that is 
commonly associated with RPDM.  
3) The participant is using a heuristic approach that dictates group membership of a 
case based upon the differences between a particular case, and those previously experienced. 
This is a type of change-detection that can be associated with the violation of expectation 
principle (Klein et al., 2005) described in Chapter 1.  
4) The participants were using a combination of such strategies. 
 
In particular, performance on the complex event problems can be used to determine 
which of these four outcomes is occurring. The complex problems were either complex 
conflict events or complex environmental events. The two heuristic strategies; change-
detection (CD) and pattern-matching (PM) can achieve success on only one complex problem 
type. A CD strategy could achieve success on complex environmental events but would incur 
an error in the complex conflict events. A PM strategy would successfully identify complex 
conflict events but would systematically lead to failure in the complex environmental events.   
The reason these strategies would result in the mentioned errors is due to which cues 
each heuristic approach would utilise. Pattern-matching (PM) is a rudimentary form of 
recognition-based decision making. This would materialise when a salient cue becomes 
indicative of the entire system state. Participants using this approach would associate the state 
of the simulation with the presence of a single salient cue. This cue could be either the 
presence of weapons, or the presence of an environmental event. For example, if participants 
associate a large rapid increase in weapons with a conflict, then they may regard the 
environmental data as superfluous and focus only on the weapons. It is possible to identify 
simple conflicts and simple environmental events using this approach only. However, for 
complex trials, this would achieve success on the complex conflict events – trials where there 
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is a conflict (identified via a large rapid increase in weapons) and an environmental event 
which may not be attended to. This PM strategy would, however, fail on the complex 
environmental events – as the weapons distributions profile is the same as a conflict, and has 
its genesis in multiple environmental events which can only be detected by monitoring the 
environmental data. If a participant is using only the single cue of the weapons data as a 
proxy indicator for the state of the system, then success would not be found on this problem 
type.  
Similarly, change-detection (CD) also creates a detectable error pattern. Change-
detection is a heuristic strategy based on the violation of expectation – when there is a cue in 
the environment which does not act like anticipated which may alert the participant that a 
change has occurred. For example, in simple conflict events, there is minimal change in the 
values corresponding to the environmental data, as there are no environmental events. As 
such, this environmental data remains relatively stable over a series of conflict trials. An 
example of a change –detection strategy would be when participants notice a change in the 
environmental data due to the onset of an environmental trial following a conflict trial, and 
thus reason a solution based on the new problem being different to the previous problem. If a 
participant is solving multiple simple conflict trials and becomes sensitive to the stability of 
the environmental data, then a disturbance in this environmental data may alert the participant 
that the problem requires an environmental event as the answer, and this would be correct for 
the simple environmental events. However, this creates issues in the identification of complex 
events. A participant using a CD strategy and solving problems based on the sudden presence 
or absence of environmental events would be expected to correctly solve complex 
environmental events (where there is an onset of an environmental event which is the cause 
of the change) and would lead to failure in the case of complex conflict events (where there is 
an environmental event that is not explanatory of the change in arms traffic). See Table 4 for 
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a comparison of behaviours between each strategy.  
 
Table 4. Table showing how strategies are mapped to participants based on the 
responses to pairs of complex events. 
Strategy Complex Environmental Complex Conflict 
Inferential Correct Correct 
Pattern-matching Incorrect Correct 
Change-detection Correct Incorrect 
 
The experiment contained two pairs of complex problems, and each participant’s 
strategy was inferred from their performance on each pair of problems. Participants who 
correctly solved both complex problems in a pair were deemed to be using correct inferential 
reasoning. Participants who correctly solved both problems but demonstrated errors in other 
parts of the task, or incorrectly solved both problems, were categorised as using a possible 
mixture of the CD or PM strategies.  
The other manipulation was mental set, to test for an Einstellung effect in anomaly 
handling. This is on the basis that familiarity encourages mental rigidity, and this rigidity may 
incur solution penalties when facing new types of problem. To integrate this into our 
experiment, the notion of high frequency normality was used to establish familiarity. In those 
we wished to establish a mental set, we provided a similar series of problems with similar 
outcomes. For this, the simple conflict problem type was chosen as it utilises the fewest cues 
in the simulation. It is then possible to test for mental set effects by subsequently providing 
participants with a problem type similar in appearance to the simple conflict but requires an 
alternative solution. For this, the complex environmental problem type was chosen, on the 
basis that the weapons distribution profiles of these two types of problems are identical. For 
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this reason, it is expected that, where a mental set has been established prior to the onset of 
the complex environmental problem, participants will identify similarities in weapons 
distribution and classify it similarly to those from the simple conflict problem type.   
The anticipated behaviour of participants, as informed by the previous research 
described above, results in a number of hypotheses surrounding the use of the task, and the 
manipulation of mental set. Firstly, it is expected that participants will achieve higher 
solution rates on the simple problems than the complex problems. This is because complex 
problems require the interpretation of more cues from the simulated environment. The simple 
problems have a solution that favours the weighting of individual cues differently to those 
required for a successful solution. Secondly, those participants that experience an induced 
mental set by repetition of the same problem-type will suffer lower solution rates on a 
subsequent complex problem when it shares stimuli similarity with the problem-types that 
were used to establish the mental set. Thirdly, errors in the way that complex problems are 
answered will allow us to identify additional heuristic strategies used by participants. 
   
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
All participants were recruited from the University of Surrey. Undergraduate 
psychology students received a course credit for participation. A total of 24 individuals were 
tested (23 female, 1 male). 
3.2.2 Design 
A 2x2x2 mixed design was used for this study.  Set was a between-subjects factor 
with two levels: set and no set. Participants were randomly allocated between these 
conditions. The difference between set and no set conditions was the order of presentation of 
stimuli. Those in the set condition received a series of simple conflict problems prior to the 
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complex environmental problems. In the no set condition, the complex environmental 
problems were preceding by mixed problem types.  
One within-subjects factor was Event, with two levels; environmental, and conflict. 
Another within-subjects factor was Complexity, with two levels; simple, and complex. These 
factors combined to create 4 distinct problem types: simple conflict event, simple 
environmental event, complex conflict event and complex environmental event. All problems 
were completed by both groups. 
3.2.3 Materials 
The task was conducted at a computer using a digital version of the simulation 
explained in Chapter 2, the simulation was coded and programmed using bespoke 
experimental software, PsyScript (based on AppleScript). To summarise, participants were 
given a series of 18 trials to solve, concerning the security situation of a fictional country. In 
each trial participant had access to information on the distribution of weapons across 
geographical locations, along with the local environmental conditions at the time.  The trials 
were presented within a simulated intelligence task.  The simulation consisted of three visual 
elements; a map, a table containing the distribution of weapons, and a table containing 
environmental conditions. The map showed four zones alongside the supply routes by which 
weapons are known to be trafficked. A number of terrain features were also marked that 
intersected these supply routes; a mountain pass, a river, and a series of underground tunnels. 
The weapon distribution table showed the estimated number of weapons in each zone across 
five time-points. The table of environmental conditions gave information on three variables 
across those same five-time-points; rainfall, temperature, and recent seismic activity. 
Each trial comprised of five time points across which the weapons distribution and 
environmental conditions were updated. Participants had to classify each trial into one of 
three categories: no event, conflict event, or environmental event. At the beginning of each 
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trial, all weapons were distributed equally between zones. As the simulation progressed, the 
supply of weapons could become asymmetrical, leading to large differences between zones in 
the number of weapons they possessed. The distribution of weapons during the simulation 
was determined by the presence of one of the three possible events.  
The simulation was designed so that problems were explained exclusively by one of 
three possible hypotheses; scenarios where no significant arms traffic change had occurred, 
scenarios where arms traffic had changed due to environmental events, and scenarios where 
arms traffic changed due to conflict events.  The correct response could be inferred from 
relationships between weapons supply, possible conflicts and environmental conditions, as 
follows: 
• No changes in arms supply across zones over time indicated no presence of 
environmental or conflict events. 
• A conflict is indicated by an accumulation of weapons in a single zone over time. Since 
weapons supply is finite, this leads to decrease in weapons supply to other zones.  
• Changes in weapons distribution across zones might also indicate a change in 
environmental conditions. Each zone possesses terrain features along their supply routes 
(e.g., river, tunnels, mountain pass). High rainfall floods the rivers, recent seismic 
activity collapses tunnels, and large decreases in temperature freeze the mountain pass. 
When the supply route of a zone passes through a terrain feature affected by these 
conditions, that supply route becomes treacherous. Treacherous supply routes lower the 
number of weapons that can be delivered to those affected zones. When this occurs, 
surplus weapons are sent to regions with non-treacherous supply routes.  For example, if 
Zone A requires crossing a river, and Zones B, C and D do not, then high rainfall would 
make the route to Zone A treacherous, leading to fewer weapons arriving in Zone A, 
which would then be redistributed evenly between Zones B, C and D. One or more zones 
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can be affected by closure of supply routes due to environmental conditions at any one 
time and which routes are treacherous can be determined by information provided in the 
environmental conditions table. 
 
3.2.4 Procedure 
Each participant was presented with written task instructions that were available 
throughout the experiment and included a set of rules that the simulation followed, including 
classification criteria for each problem-type. Participants then received on-screen instructions 
that introduced the visual elements of the task. Participants were given three practice trials 
that consisted of one of each possible scenario outcome (no event, simple environmental 
event, and simple conflict event). During the practice scenarios, participants were able to 
question the experimenter and were given the correct solution to ensure they understood the 
response options. After the three practice scenarios, participants completed a series of 18 
problem trials. These trials comprised three no event problems, seven simple conflict-events, 
and four  simple environment events. There were two complex environmental events where 
multiple environmental conditions interacted together to create a weapons distribution profile 
that appeared erroneously to indicate a conflict. The remaining two problems were complex 
conflict events that are conflict event scenarios that were made more difficult by the presence 
of a significant change of environmental conditions that occurred in irrelevant parts of the 
map. These four tasks required careful reasoning to discriminate between conflict and 
environmental explanations.      
Participants in the set condition received a series of three conflict trials before being 
presented with the complex trials. In the no set condition, the exact same trials were used, but 
the order was changed to ensure that the problem types preceding the complex trials were 
mixed in nature between conflict and environmental trials. The order of presentation of the 
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trials can be found in Table 5 which illustrates the difference between set and no set 
conditions. 
Table 5.  Order of presentation of stimuli between set and no set conditions.                      
X  = conflict events, -  = non-conflict events,  0  = complex environmental event trials. 
Condition	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 14	 15	 16	 17	 18	
Set	 -	 X	 -	 -	 -	 X	 X	 X	 0	 X	 X	 -	 -	 -	 X	 X	 X	 0	
No	set	 -	 X	 -	 X	 X	 -	 X	 -	 0	 X	 X	 -	 X	 X	 -	 X	 -	 0	
 
As the simulation progressed, an on-screen prompt appeared to participants. 
Participants were required to choose one of the three possible hypotheses they believed best 
described the current status of the system:  
i. No events occurred; 
ii. Change due to environmental events;  
iii. Change due to conflict events.  
Once a decision had been captured for that particular problem, the next trial began. 
This returned the tables to a state of equal distribution and represented the first time-point in a 
new scenario. 
After instructions and familiarisation with the system, participants were instructed to 
complete the task as fast as possible while maintaining accuracy. Participants spent 30 
minutes with the researcher from start to finish.  
3.2.5 Coding Strategy 
Performance on the complex problems can be used to determine strategy. Each of the 
two heuristic strategies; change-detection (CD) and pattern-matching (PM) can achieve 
success on only one type of complex problem type. The complex problems were either 
complex conflict events, or complex environmental events. A CD strategy could achieve 
success on a complex environmental event, but would incur an error in the complex conflict 
event. A PM strategy would reverse that, being able to successfully identify a complex 
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conflict event, but would systematically lead to failure in the complex environmental event. 
Participants who correctly solved both complex problems in a pair were deemed to be using 
inferential reasoning. Participants who correctly solved both problems but demonstrated 
errors in other parts of the task, or incorrectly solved both problems, could not systemically 
be associated with an exclusive strategy. Due to the nature of the strategies being coded, the 
strategy can only be determined across two responses to both complex problems. As such, the 
coded strategy is only computed by the performance across both complex problems and 
cannot be attributed to an individual attempt to solve a single problem. 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Analytical approach 
Data gathered from the task were the hypothesis selected in response to each scenario, 
and the time taken to reach that selection.  The responses were transformed into solution rates 
for each trial type to allow for comparisons between trial types despite unequal frequencies of 
each trial type. No-event trials were included only to ensure attention was paid to the task. 
The variables of event-type and complexity combine to create 4 distinct types of 
problem described earlier. The majority of problems presented to participants in this 
experiment were simple problems. It is not expected that Set will influence simple problems. 
Set is expected to influence the complex environmental event trials as this is the critical 
problem that follows after the set has been established and shares similar features while 
requiring a different response. As such, it is not expected for Set to create an overall 
difference on solution rates. While each factor is examined independently, it is the interaction 
between these variables at this level that is the most interesting. As prior research shows that 
knowledge structure and heuristics are important to developing expertise, this will be kept as 
a two-tailed test as heuristic development may actually lead to the creation of new domain 
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specific strategies that could enhance problem-solving.    
 
3.3.2 Solution rates 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of correct responses 
across Complexity and Event-type, with Set as a between-subjects factor. No difference was 
found for proportion of total correct responses between Set (M=0.82, SD=0.12) and those in 
the No-set conditions (M=0.83, SD=0.16), F(1,22)=0.19, p=.66, η2=.009, 95% CIs [0.77, 
0.88] and [0.78, 0.89] respectively.   
A main effect was found for Complexity, where Complex problems (M=0.69, 
SD=0.37) were solved less frequently than Simple problems (M=0.89, SD=0.17), 
F(1,22)=14.02, p<0.001, η2=.39, 95% CIs [0.59,0.78],[0.84,0.94] respectively.   
There was no significant main effect for Event type, F(1,22)=0.67, p=0.79.  
A two-way interaction for Complexity by Event was significant, F(1,22)=10.34, 
p<0.01, η2=0.32. Post-hoc tests show that complex conflict problems were solved less often 
(M=0.58, SD=0.38) than simple conflict problems (M=0.97, SD=0.07), whereas no 
difference was observed between complex environmental (M=0.79, SD=0.36) and simple 
environmental (M=0.80, SD=0.26) problems.  
All remaining two-way interactions were not significant. These were Event by Set, 
F(1,22)=0.60, p=0.45, and Complexity by Set, F(1,22)=3.68, p=0.06.  
A three-way interaction was found between Complexity, Event type and Set, 
F(1,22)=6.98, p<0.05, η2=.24, where participants in the Set condition solved fewer complex 
environmental problems (M=0.62, SD=0.14) than participants in the No Set condition 
(M=0.95, SD=0.43). See Figure 3.1 for a chart of solution rates. 
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Figure 3.1. Mean proportion of correct responses for each problem type by set (n=24)  
 
3.3.3 Solution Times 
The solution time was the time taken (in seconds) to reach a decision about the 
classification of the trial. 
An ANOVA was conducted on the solution times for Complexity and Event type by 
Set. Although time taken to solve complex problems was greater (M=27.11s, SD=18.27s) 
than the time taken to solve simple problems (M=17.39s, SD=8.8s), the main effect for 
Complexity only approached significance, F(1,20)=3.78, p=0.06, η2=.21.  There were no 
significant main effects for Set F(1,20)=0.49, p=0.35, or Event type, F(1,20)=0.16, p=0.69. 
The two-way interaction for Complexity by Event approached significance, F(1,20)=3.71, 
p=0.056. The two-way interactions of Complexity by Set, F(1,20)=0.10, p=0.75, and Set by 
Event, F(1,20)=1.19, p=0.27 were also not significant. The three-way interaction for 
Complexity by Event by Set was also not significant, F(1,20)=0.41, p=0.52. See Figure 3.2 
for correct solution times for each specific problem type by set. 
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Figure 3.2. Correct solution time (s) for each specific type of problem by set (n=24).  
 
3.3.4 Strategy use 
The problem pairs were coded according to the four strategies outlined in 3.2.5. Of the 48 
problem pairs coded, 9 could not be attributed to an exclusive strategy, and only the 
remaining 37 were included. Figure 3.3 shows the frequency of use of each strategy between 
each group. The pattern-matching (PM) strategy occurred more frequently in the Set group 
than the No Set group. The change-detection (CD) strategy occurred more frequently in the 
No Set group. Both groups had equivalent numbers of participants using both inferential 
strategies. A Chi Square showed that these differences in frequency of strategy use approach, 
but were ultimately not significant, χ2 (2, N=37) = 5.95, p=0.051.  
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Figure 3.3. Frequency of each strategy use across all problem-pairs between the set and no 
set groups. 
 
The above figure examines the aggregate of all problem-pairs. It is also possible to 
examine the frequency of strategy use for each problem-pair separately, so that change in 
strategy over time can be examined. The first block of problem-pairs, Block 1, was the first 
occurrence of a problem-pair within the task. This occurred within the first 9 trials. Block 2 
was the second occurrence of the problem-pair that occurred between trial 9-18. 
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Figure 3.4. Frequency of strategy use as identified in Block 1 problem-pairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Frequency of strategy use as identified in Block 2 problem-pairs. 
 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the frequency of use of each strategy between set and no set 
groups at each of the two points in time. Strategy use appears to change over time. Most 
notably, the no-set groups move away from inferential and combined strategies towards a CD 
strategy. The set group appears to maintain their use of inferential and combined strategies, 
with a small move from CD towards PM strategies.  
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3.3.5 Strategy and Response times 
 An ANOVA was conducted to re-analyse response time (in seconds) for each 
strategy. To identify these cases, the response times for trials in the problem-pairs were 
averaged across responses from both response times to both problems within the problem-
pair, and re-analysed based on the identified strategy. A significant effect was found of 
Strategy, with inferential strategies (M=34.34s, SD=24.67s) taking longer than those using 
pattern-matching (M=22.07s, SD=14.91s) and change-detection (M=23.48s, SD=18.46s) 
strategies, F(3,88) = 2.77, p = 0.01, η 2=0.18.  A significant interaction was also found, 
F(3,88) = 3.25, p = 0.025, η 2=0.10. Post hoc tests show that for the pattern-matching 
strategy, the set group took longer than the no set group. For the inferential strategy, the set 
group were faster than the no set group. All response times for strategy and group type are 
shown in Figure 3.6. While it is notable that the pattern-matching strategy found in the no set 
group had an extremely low average response time, it should be pointed out that this PM/No 
set strategy was only identified in one problem-pair and so represents a single data point from 
a single participant. 
 
Figure 3.6. Mean response times (seconds) for average problem-pair responses for strategy 
by set. 
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3.4 Discussion 
In this study, we examined the solution rates and times in a security assessment task 
consisting of sets of simple and complex trials. The rationale for including the complex 
problems was that they are representative of anomalies. The complex environmental event 
presents a combination of environmental factors that combine to create a weapon distribution 
profile unlike simple environmental events, but similar to a simple conflict event. Incorrectly 
classifying them as the latter is a type of false positive, a scenario that has an appearance of a 
threat, but actually is harmless. This is akin to the type of error that drone operators make 
when striking a wedding instead of a group of militants. Conversely, complex conflict event 
problems could only be explained by a conflict event, but the presence of an environmental 
factor made them appear similar to simple environmental problems. Incorrectly classifying 
them as the latter is a type of false negative. In order to solve these problem types 
successfully, participants have to reason according to the rules and overcome heuristic 
responses based on cue saliency. 
The study also examined the phenomenon of mental set, in which the presentation 
order of problems was manipulated prior to the onset of complex event scenarios. Participants 
in the set condition received a series of three conflict event trials prior to a complex 
environmental trial (representing an anomaly). As a result, they solved fewer trials than 
participants in the no-set condition. The results indicate that the similarity in cue 
characteristics creates poorer performance for those in the set condition. Participants’ 
previous success at categorising the conflict problems based on their weapon distribution 
profiles may lead them to put more weight on the diagnostic relevance of the distribution 
profile, and subsequently rely on a strategy of pattern-matching in which the weapons 
distribution profile is examined and determine to either match or not match the typical profile 
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of that problem type. This would explain the high solution rates of other problem types, and 
explains the failure to identify the complex environmental problem. Participants in the set 
group who then attempted to solve the complex anomaly problem using a pattern-matching 
approach would look to see if any new problems had a weapon distribution pattern consistent 
with a simple conflict event and could have paid less attention to the environmental 
conditions, which had not been diagnostically relevant up until that point. Participants in the 
no-set group would have been more likely to attempt to use all of the information available to 
them, allowing them to detect changes in environmental conditions and subsequently classify 
the problem correctly.   
The idea that some participants may be using a pattern-matching strategy does not 
explain the high solution rates for the complex environmental event problems for participants 
in the no set group. To account for these results, another strategy must be introduced, one of 
change-detection. During the critical false positive trial achieved through the use of a 
complex environmental event, participants may recognise the distinctive distribution profile 
of a conflict; however, they also are capable of detecting change in the environmental 
information. If participants recognise the weapons distribution as similar to a simple conflict 
event, but detect a change in environmental conditions that the previous simple problem type 
does not have, then they could reason that the situation must be different from the simple 
explanation and choose the remaining alternative.  
The other problem type of interest is the false negative given by complex conflict 
events. This problem had the lowest mean solution rates across both groups. For this problem 
type, a scenario was presented in which the weapons distribution profile indicated a conflict 
event. However, an environmental indicator was also present in an irrelevant region to the 
conflict. In effect, there is a conflict event occurring, but also an irrelevant environmental 
effect that acted as noise. In order to achieve success on this problem, participants would 
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have to recognise the weapons distribution as being created due to a conflict event only, and 
reason that the final distribution could not be caused by the environmental event present.  
Using a change-detection strategy, participants would recognise the distinctive 
conflict-like weapons distribution, but that they also perceive the environmental effect that 
could lead them to classify the scenario as one being different to a conflict event. This 
approach worked for the solution of the complex environmental event, but here would be 
incorrectly applied to this problem and lead to a failure to identify the conflict that is driving 
distribution in favour of merely noticing a perceptual difference between problems.   
Conversely, those using a pattern-matching approach may prioritise the diagnostic 
relevance of the weapons distribution and ignore the environmental information. For complex 
environmental events, this strategy leads to an error in failing to identify the true cause of a 
situation. However, for complex conflict events, a pattern-matching strategy could provide a 
correct solution, since participants pay more attention to the weapon distribution. For the 
complex conflict event, an account of pattern-matching and change-detection would lead to 
those using a pattern-matching strategy to correctly solve more of this problem type than 
those using a change-detection strategy. It was predicted that those in the set condition would 
correctly identify this scenario more often than those in the no set condition. While our 
results support the direction of this prediction, the difference between set and no set was not 
significant for this problem type.  
The use of pattern-matching and change-detection heuristics appears to explain errors 
with complex problems, yet the majority of scenarios faced by participants are simple 
problems (simple conflict event, simple environmental event, no event) that can be solved 
using these heuristics. As such, they represent an efficient method of decision-making. In this 
study, there were 14 simple problems, and 4 complex problems, if each strategy is only 
failing on 2 of the complex problems, then a change-detection or pattern-matching approach 
 76 
will be successful on 16 out of 18 trials. The simulation works around a core system of 
logical statements that dictate the distribution of weapons based upon a number of factors. 
Both pattern-matching and change-detection strategies ignore this logic in favour of 
interpreting the outcome of the system based upon a suboptimal strategy developed during 
the solution of simple problems.  
However, results from solution time data suggest that participants are taking longer to 
solve complex problems. If participants were adhering to a single strategy approach as 
discussed, then we would expect participants to respond in the same timeframe for complex 
problems as for simple problems, as decisions would be based upon perceptual information 
from the simulation environment rather than reasoning. However, the increased solution time 
for complex problems suggests that participants are aware of the conflicting information 
being presented to them. Perhaps an awareness of the entire environment is present and 
participants attempt to reason the inconsistencies observed in complex problems, but when 
this becomes difficult participants fall back onto their strategies that have worked for simple 
problems leading to error.  
This unexpected finding aligns with two previous areas of psychological research. 
Fasolo, McClellend and Lange (2005) found that conflicting evidence increases the perceived 
difficulty of a task. Bettman, Johnson, Luce and Payne (1993) found that participants are 
willing to trade accuracy for effort. It may be that by detecting a conflict in the information 
streams, participants then realise the task is more difficult and trade off accuracy for effort by 
employing the suboptimal heuristics. This would explain the lower solution rates on complex 
trials whilst still having higher solution times.  
Another area that could have impacted is that of perceptual error, where participants 
simply failed to notice a relevant cue in the task. Simple environmental problems had 
weapons distributions altered due to a presence of environmental events. However, the level 
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of weapons in each zone never reaches the heightened levels seen for conflict events.  If 
environmental events made supply to one zone treacherous, this zone would have its supply 
redistributed along remaining safe routes. Similarly, if the supply routes to two zones were 
treacherous, the combined supply would be redistributed along remaining safe routes. Thus, a 
small number of weapons may be shared by three zones, or a larger number of weapons may 
be shared by two zones. The number of affected supply routes may affect a change-detection 
heuristic because two-zone scenarios show a more marked change in weapons distribution 
than one-zone scenarios, which mean that the level of change is too small for participants to 
detect for some trials.  
Change-detection may also be influenced by the variables used to represent 
environmental information. The scales used for rainfall and temperature are large and 
changes within them are easy to spot, but seismic activity was represented using the Richter 
scale, a base-10 logarithmic scale where changes are smaller. Changes in rainfall from 7mm 
to 70mm or in temperature from 16C to -16C are noticeable, but a change in Richter from 5 
to 6 may not be clear. This may explain why solution rates for simple environmental events 
are lower than those of simple conflict or no-event problems. The Richter scale represented 
recent seismic activity. Scenarios involving changes caused by seismic activity had one of the 
lowest solution rates, even lower than some of the complex problems. Participants using a 
change-detection approach failed to detect subtle change in this indicator and did not consider 
it a relevant cue. This would explain a number of participants who incorrectly categorised 
this scenario as a no event scenario. Where participants focussed on the weapons distribution 
information they had to account for a change in weapons when there appeared no 
environmental event, which could lead them to classify the scenario as a conflict. This 
suggests that change-detection is a generic strategy that was used for simple as well as 
complex problems.  
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More participants in the set group used a pattern-matching approach, while those in 
the no-set group tended to use change-detection. The set group presumably weighted the 
information provided by the weapons distribution profile higher than the information 
provided by environmental conditions. Weapons distribution alone is capable of solving the 
set-congruent problems and this strategy did not change when the nature of the problems did. 
This appears to follow the pattern of choosing a sub-optimal solution strategy due to 
familiarity and repetitiveness when a more appropriate alternative solution existed, as seen in 
classical mental set (Einstelling effect) literature outlined in Chapter 1. It is likely that 
participants developed dependency for using the weapons information as the only cue, and 
learnt to discriminate the different simple event trials using a single cue. Examination of the 
frequency of use of strategy was also examined across the two problem blocks. For the set 
group, strategy change was minor, with a slight convergence towards pattern-matching. 
However, for the no set group, a rapid and strong change was noticed with participants more 
likely to be using a change-detection strategy on the second block than the first. It may be 
that the no-set group used inferential reasoning more frequently in block one because of 
unfamiliarity with the system. After familiarisation, participants can begin to identify 
heuristics for making their decisions and shift to a less cognitively expensive strategy.  For 
the set group, mental set may restrict the search for alternative explanations since identifying 
a recurring pattern seems to work effectively. This may be why set showed continued 
reliance on weapons distribution in the development of pattern-matching strategies which 
failed on the complex environmental tasks. 
 One of the more prominent issues with this experiment is that it showed a detriment in 
performance over time. Some participants started off using inferential strategies (and thus 
were attaining higher solution rates in the first part of the task) before switching to heuristic 
strategies (which result in lower solution rates later in the task). An extension of this is that 
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participants were using heuristics from the start and made critical errors on complex trials 
throughout. We also found that establishing a mental set lowered solution rates on complex 
problems that share surface-level similarities. This is an issue because once participants begin 
to make errors, there is no way for participants to know that what they are doing is not 
successful. As the goal of this research is to prevent these mistakes, participants need to know 
when they are making them. This concept was the design focus of the next experiment.  
 A second issue with this research was the small size of trials completed, at only 18 
trials, there was only two instances of each of the complex event trials. As solution rates were 
calculated proportionally to compensate for unequal frequencies, this may impact the 
complex problems more as a single error on the first complex trial has a bigger impact on 
solution rates for those complex events. However, this is difficult to control for, as by vastly 
increasing the number of complex trials takes away their ability to be an ‘anomaly’ and will 
simply result in them being recognised as just another type of problem.    
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4 Experiment 2 – Feedback  
4.1 Introduction 
Experiment 1 found differences in problem-solving strategy between the set and no 
set groups. However, there was little improvement over time; instead performance actually 
decreased over time as participants developed heuristics they believed suitable for problem 
solving that led to errors. This can be seen in the no set group switching from an inferential 
strategy to a heuristic strategy of change-detection as the simulation progressed within a 
single session. The low solution times of the no set group using pattern-matching strategies 
suggest that very little information was being attended to and further suggests reliance upon 
inaccurate heuristics.  
It is possible that performance can become worse over time as there was no way for 
participants to test how well they were doing as no feedback as administered until after the 
experiment. Participants solving problems during the experiment would likely become 
confident in their reasoning and use that same reasoning again to tackle future problems, as 
we have seen in the research for cognitive rigidity in Chapter 1. However, participants were 
never informed that their reasoning may be inaccurate, or when their current strategies were 
unsuccessful. This can be eliminated if feedback was introduced after each problem, as it 
would then signal to participants that the strategies they are using are not working.  
Feedback leads to further testable hypotheses. Firstly, if participants are using 
heuristic strategies, then the introduction of feedback should increase solution times, as 
participants may slow down to analyse responses in more detail after they have been 
informed their chosen solution was incorrect. By introducing feedback, we may also get a 
better test of the true effects of mental set, as feedback provides an opportunity for corrective 
behaviour in regards to incorrect solution strategies. Secondly, introducing feedback should 
allow participants to achieve higher solution rates across all problem types, as fixation on 
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heuristics may be lessened as participants are informed when they are unsuccessful. This will 
not only be further evidence that heuristics were used in Experiment 1 but also show how 
flexible participants can be to changing strategies when they are discovered to be inadequate. 
However, due to the nature of the problems, it is still expected that complex environmental 
problems will be solved the least due to the complexity of the strategy required for solution.  
The number of trials was increased to overcome the disproportionate impact of errors 
for complex trials.  However, while this was changed from Experiment 1 to increase the 
reliability of solution rates, it does eliminate the ability to attribute the pattern-matching and 
change-detection strategies.  The attribution of these strategies was only possible by 
comparing responses over problem-pairs. With the increase in the number of complex 
problems in this experiment, there is no longer a single problem pair to be coded. 
 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
All participants were recruited online through social media advertisement. The web 
address was circulated online among academic interest groups in order to attract suitable 
participants. Participants were entered into a random prize draw upon completion of the 
experiment. An additional prize was awarded based upon performance to incentivise taking 
the experiment seriously. A total of 56 individuals completed the experiment (34 male, 22 
females). Age of participants ranged from 18 to 53 (M = 23.5, SD = 7.1). Although the 
geographical location of participants was predominantly from the United Kingdom (n=40), 
other countries participating included the USA (n=6), Canada (n=2), Germany (n=2), 
Hungary (n=1), Kenya (n=1), Norway (n=1), Poland (n=1) and Sweden (n=1). Participants 
had to click a confirmation button that they were fluent in English. A further 31 participants 
began the experiment but did not finish, these participants were considered to have 
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withdrawn and were excluded from analysis. 
 
4.2.2 Design 
A 2x2x2 mixed design was used for this study, identical to the previous experiment. 
The between–subjects factor of Set was retained (set, no set). The within-subjects factor of 
Event was retained consisting of two levels; environmental, and conflict. Another within-
subjects factor was Complexity that also consisted of two levels; simple trials, and complex 
trials.  These factors combined to create 4 distinct problem-types that were identical to those 
in Experiment 1. The key difference between this experiment and Experiment 1 was the 
inclusion of immediate feedback after every trial.  
 
4.2.3 Materials 
The paradigm used in this experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except now it 
was hosted on the internet using a web-based platform.  For this experiment, an increased 
number of trials were used. A total of 54 trials were created with 24 simple conflict events, 6 
simple environmental events, 12 complex conflict events, 6 complex environmental events, 
and 6 no-event problems.  
The experiment consisted of 6 problem-blocks, each containing a number of problems 
from various problem types, but always culminating with a complex environmental event. In 
the set conditions, this problem was directly preceded by a series of 4 simple conflict 
problems. In the no-set condition, this problem was preceded by a mixture of problem types.  
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
The experiment was hosted online using a researcher-owned web address 
(http://www.anomalyhandling.com). Participants visiting the web address were welcomed, 
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presented with an information sheet and consent form. Participants were informed that 
participation was voluntary and that they could exit the study at any time by closing the web 
browser. Continuing with the experiment yielded a comprehensive set of instructions that 
informed the participant about the system they were about to use. Rules were explained, 
examples were given, and participants were allowed to explore this until they felt ready to 
begin (these instructions can be found in Appendix 1). Once participants were ready they 
could begin the experiment. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that after 
each decision is submitted, the participant received feedback informing them of the correct 
response to each problem. This feedback was shown before they proceed to the following 
problem, and was present after every trial. 
 
4.3 Results 
The data comprise the categorisation of the event type for each trial, and the time 
taken to make that decision. A problem was considered correct if the categorisation was the 
same as the target classification. The responses were transformed into solution rates for each 
trial type to allow for comparisons between trial types despite unequal frequencies of each 
trial type.  
4.3.1 Solution rates 
Figure 4.1 shows the mean solution rates for each condition. An ANOVA was 
conducted on the proportion of correct response across Complexity, Event and Set. No 
difference was found in the solution rates between the set condition (M =0.94, SD=0.03) and 
the no set condition (M=0.93,SD=0.07), F(1,53)=0.14, p=0.71, η2=.003, 95% CIs [0.91,0.98] 
and [0.90,0.97]. A main effect of Event was found, F(1,53)=5.18, p<0.05, η2=.09. 
Environmental problems were solved significantly less often (M=0.91, SD=0.15) than 
conflict problems (M=0.96, SD=0.06), 95% CIs [0.87,0.95] and [0.94,0.98].  A main effect 
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was also found for Complexity, with complex trials (M= 0.89,SD=0.14) solved significantly 
less often than simple trials (M=0.99,SD=0.05), F(1,53)=36.62, p<0.001, η2=.41, 95% CIs 
[0.85,0.93] and [0.97,1.0]. 
 There were no significant interactions, though the Complexity by Event approached 
significance, F(1,53)=3.69, p=0.06 and trended in the predicted direction, with complex 
environmental trials having lower solution rates than complex conflict trials. The other non-
significant two-way interactions were Complexity by Set, F(1,53)=0.16, p=0.69, and Set by 
Event F(1,53)=0.42, p=0.84. The three-way interaction between Set, Complexity and Event 
was also not significant, F(1,53)=0.22,  p=0.64. 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean proportion of solution rates for event-type and complexity by set (n=56). 
 
4.3.2 Solution times 
Figure 4.2 shows the mean solution times (in seconds) for each condition. An 
ANOVA was conducted on the mean solution times across all independent variables. The 
effect of Set was not significant, (Mset = 33.94s,SD=15.58s_; Mno set  = 33.01s,SD=9.15s), 
F(1,53)=0.02, p=0.88,  A main effect was found for Complexity, with simple trials 
(M=28.96s, SD=17.48s) being solved faster than complex trials (M=38.00s, SD=28.41s), 
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F(1,53)=15.38, p<0.001, η2=0.23, 95% CIs [24.07s,33.84s] and [30.05s, 45.95s].  Event was 
not significant (Mconflict = 35.23s; Menvironmental =31.72s), F(1,53)=1.09, p=0.30. 
 A significant interaction was found for Complexity by Event, F(1,53)=4.34, p<0.05, 
η2=.079, where complex environmental trials (M=43.07s, SD=49.61s) took significantly 
longer to solve than complex conflict trials (M=32.96s, SD=14.26s). Other interactions were 
not significant. These were Complexity by Set, F(1,53)=0.38, p=0.54, Event by Set, 
F(1,53)=0.41, p=0.84, and the three-way interaction of Complexity by Set by Event, 
F(1,53)=1.21, p=0.27.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean solution time (in seconds) across complexity and event by set (n=56). 
 
4.3.3 Learning over trials 
This experiment comprised of six blocks of problems that each culminated with a complex 
environmental event problem. Solution rates on this problem were captured for each 
problem-block, and an ANOVA was conducted with Problem block and Set as factors. Mean 
solution rates on block 1 (M=0.77) were lower than block 2 (M=0.79), block 3 (M=0.81), 
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block 4 (M=0.90), block 5 (M=0.92), and block 6 (M=0.87) although these differences 
narrowly missed significance, F(5,250)=2.17, p=0.058, η2=.042.  There was no significant 
effect of Set, F(5,250)=0.1, p=0.76, η2=.002. There was no significant interaction for Set by 
Problem-block, F(5,250)=1.03, p=0.40. See Figure 4.3 for the solution rates of complex 
environmental event problems across problem blocks for set.  
 
Figure 4.3. Mean solution rates for complex environmental event problem across problem-
block between set and no set (n=56).  
 
4.4 Discussion 
In Experiment 1, the introduction of a mental set (established with simple trials) 
inhibited successful solution of a complex trial when the set problem and complex problem 
shared surface similarities. The present study has shown that this deleterious effect of mental 
set can be negated by the introduction of immediate feedback. In Experiment 1, it was 
suggested that participants, instead of utilising the causal rules of the system to make 
decisions inferentially, instead relied upon a series of recognition-based heuristics. By 
introducing feedback in the current study, participants discovered these heuristics were not 
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appropriate and either adjusted their strategies to include drawing inferences from the 
information based upon the system logic or refined their recognition-based heuristics to be 
more discriminative between problem types.  
Introducing feedback had other consequences besides minimising the effect of set. 
Solution rates across all problem types were higher relative to Experiment 1, showing that 
feedback was not just alerting participants to potentially inappropriate strategies towards 
particular problems, but is also improving access to more optimal strategies across all 
problem types.  
However, while feedback improved performance on all problem types and eliminated 
the effect of mental set, there remained an effect of problem complexity. Complex events 
were still the most difficult to identify, and complex environmental events (false-positives, 
where a suspicious indicator is present that is capable of being innocently explained) were the 
most difficult to solve. If feedback truly was improving strategy selection and participants 
were shifting from recognition heuristics to drawing inferences, then we would not expect 
this difference in performance, as participants reasoning by the system logic should attain 
equal solution rates in all trial types.  
Rather than switching to inferential strategies and conducting causal reasoning around 
the system logic, it could be that participants were instead refining their recognition strategies 
by re-evaluating the importance of each cue in the environment and improving upon their 
ability to discern perceptual differences within the data presented to them. Potential evidence 
for a refined recognition heuristic comes from performance over time across the complex 
environmental event trial type, the most difficult trial type in the study. The average response 
time improved as exposure to the complex environmental event was increased. However, 
while these this explanation sees the mean moving in the desired and expected direction, 
these differences between problem blocks narrowly missed statistical significance (p=0.058). 
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One potential weakness shown in this study is that by increasing the number of trials 
from 18 to 54, there were now a much larger number of trials of each type. This may explain 
why we have seen increased solution rates compared with Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, 
complex trials acted as anomalies, were low frequency events (compared to the simple trials), 
and as such, participants were less exposed to them and less experienced at drawing the 
required inferences for a correct solution. Now the number of trials has increased, it could be 
that the complex trials, while still appearing less frequently than the simple trials, are no 
longer rare enough to be true anomalies, and allowed participants, with the aid of feedback, to 
simple recognise them as another type of distinct trial type. However, the fact that complex 
problems were still solved less often than simple problems shows that there is a difference in 
the structure of the problems that participants were unable to grasp successfully.  
By increasing the number of problems given during the experiment, it also eliminated 
the ability to attribute the pattern-matching and change-detection heuristic strategies.  The 
attribution of these strategies was only possible by comparing patterns of responses over 
complex problem-pairs. With the increase in the number of complex problems in this 
experiment, there was no longer a single problem pair to be coded. While this meant that 
strategy was not able to be mapped as directly as before, the experiment benefitted from 
having more complex problems solved which allowed solution rates to vary over a larger 
number of problems. 
While feedback appeared to remove the impact of mental set, it could be that the 
lower performance on complex problems comes down to how participants were weighting the 
cues within the paradigm. As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, acquisition of cues 
from the environment are critical to successful decision-making (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974) 
and it may be that by increasing the number of trials in the experiment, and exposing 
participants to a greater number of trials that can be solved using a single cue, that 
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participants still develop simple heuristics that use minimal cognitive effort by focusing on as 
few cues as possible. In order to try and promote a true picture of what this ability to solve 
complex problems looks like, Experiment 3 was conducted in which the cost of errors was 
manipulated to elicit more effort from the participants in order to explore the presence of an 
accuracy/effort trade-off, and its importance in the development of heuristics. 
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5 Experiment 3 - Cost 
5.1 Introduction 
Experiment 1 found that establishing a mental set can have negative consequences in 
solving anomalous problems. Experiment 2 showed that providing immediate feedback to 
participants minimised the negative effect of mental set. However, while achieving solution 
rate parity between set and no set conditions, feedback still failed to produce equivalently 
high solution rates between simple and complex problems. Complex problems were still not 
being solved as often as simple ones, even when the failed strategies used by participants 
were highlighted. 
The primary reason for investigating anomaly handling was to provide an account of 
potentially high-risk decision making for low frequency events. In such cases, it is imperative 
that every problem is handled successfully and not just the simpler ones. This thesis has also 
directed its experimental work towards the domain of intelligence in the security and defence 
sector. In this industry it is also sometimes not possible to be able to provide feedback to 
intelligence analysts until a long time after the event, if at all. For example, if satellite 
imagery is analysed and suspicious activity is noticed, an analyst may report this for tasking. 
The outcome of that tasking may never be revealed to the analyst, due to 
compartmentalisation of process in the defence industry, or because follow-up observations 
are not conducted for a long time. As such, immediate feedback is not always available, and 
so other ways to minimise mental set should be sought and to improve the decision-making 
process so that all problems are able to be handled to the best capability of the decision-
maker rather than relying on heuristics that only work in standard cases.  
One such potential method is the introduction of cost. Anomaly handling is often 
associated with high-risk decision making. The penalty for failing to make a correct decision 
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can be catastrophic.  
Experiment 3 explored the impact of cost of errors on the performance of participants 
using the anomaly-handling intelligence paradigm. This was measured by the introduction of 
a cost versus no cost group. It was hypothesised that those in the cost group will take longer 
to solve problems than those in the no cost group, and that there will be an increase in 
solution rates for the cost group over the no cost group.  
The cost that was added to the paradigm was in the form of a financial penalty for 
errors made during the problem solving task. The cost group lost money for each incorrect 
decision made, while the no cost group suffered no penalty for error. Participants in the cost 
group began the experiment with a set amount of money (£5.40, representing 10p per trial), 
and subsequently lost 20p per incorrect response given. Participants in the no cost group 
received the full amount of their reward for participation and suffered no negative outcomes 
for incorrect solutions.  
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants  
A total of 70 undergraduate psychology students recruited from the University of 
Sussex received course credits for participation (50 females, 20 males). Ages ranged from 18-
41 (M=19.5, SD=3.07).  
 
5.2.2 Design 
A 2x2x2x2 mixed design was used for this experiment. There were two between-
subjects factors and two within-subjects factors. The between-subject factor of Set was 
retained (set, no set). A second between-subject factor was Cost, consisting of two levels 
(cost, no cost). Combining these factors creates four separate subgroups and participants were 
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randomly assigned to each: set x cost (18 participants), set x no cost (19 participants), no set 
x cost (18 participants) and no set x no cost (15 participants). Within-subject factors of 
Complexity (complex trials, simple trials) and Event-type (conflict event, environmental 
event) were retained. As with Experiments 1 and 2, these created four distinct trial-types; 
simple conflict event, simple environmental event, complex conflict event, and complex 
environmental event. As in previous studies, no event trials were incorporated into the task as 
a control to check for participant awareness and attention.  
5.2.3 Materials 
The task used in this experiment was identical to the task used in Experiment 2. The 
paradigm is a classification task where participants must evaluate each trial and categorise it 
based upon event-type (conflict or environmental). Instructions were included within the 
system that detailed how to complete the task and explained the rules of the system. A total of 
54 trials were completed by all participants. These 54 trials consisted of 24 simple conflict 
trials, 6 simple environmental trials, 12 complex conflict trials, 6 complex environmental trials 
and 6 no event trials. 
Trials were arranged into six equal blocks. All blocks culminated in a complex 
environmental trial. For the set group, this complex environmental trial was preceded by a 
series of four simple conflict trials, whereas in the no set group it was preceded by a variety 
of different trial types. Each block contained the same trials, the order of presentation being 
the only difference for set and no set groups. 
 
5.2.4 Procedure 
Each participant was tested alone. Participants were given information sheets 
explaining the experiment and were asked for their informed consent. Once consent had been 
obtained, participants were guided to use the instruction material built within the system to 
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learn the elements of the simulation display and the governing rules of the paradigm. Once 
the training had been completed, participants were given time to ask questions or 
clarifications to the researcher. Participants then began the experiment and were presented 
with the 54 trials. Participants responded to each trial by manually selecting a written 
statement on the screen that matched their evaluation of the trial.  
For both groups, each participant was told they had a starting pool of £5.40 
(representing 10p per trial). Those in the cost group were told that they would lose 20p per 
incorrect solution, and so a solution rate of greater than 50% was required for them to earn 
anything. Participants in the no cost group were told that they would receive the full amount 
of £5.40 regardless of performance. 
Feedback was shown after each trial so that participants in the cost group knew when 
an error had been made and a cost had been incurred.  
5.3 Results 
The data comprise the categorisation decision for each trial and the time taken to 
reach that decision. A problem was considered correct if the participants’ categorisation was 
the same as the trial-type classification. Participants were removed from further analysis if 
they scored less than 50% on the no event control comparison trials. Two participants were 
removed from analysis via this method.   
5.3.1 Solution rates 
Figure 5.1 shows mean solution rates for Complexity and Event-type by Set and Cost.  
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of correct responses across 
Complexity, Event-type, Mental set, and Cost.  No significant difference was found between 
set (M=0.87, SD=0.13) and no set conditions (M=0.86, SD=0.11), F(1,56)=.056, p=0.82, 
η2=.001, 95% CIs [.83,.92] and [.81, .92]. A main effect was found for Cost, with those in the 
cost group (M=0.92, SD=0.08) solving significantly more trials correctly than those in the no 
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cost group (M=0.82, SD=0.15), F(1, 56)=7.14, p=0.01, η2=.11, 95% CIs [.87,.96] and 
[.77,.87]. A main effect was found for Complexity, with complex trials (M=0.78, SD=0.21) 
solved significantly less often than simple trials (M=0.96, SD=0.11), F(1,56)=55.20, p<0.001, 
η2=.50, 95% CIs [.72,.83] and [.93,.99]. Another main effect was found for Event-type, with 
conflict trials (M=0.93, SD=0.11) being solved at a higher rate than environmental trials 
(M=0.81, SD=0.20), F(1,56)=29.10, p<0.001, η2=.34, 95% CIs [.90,95] and [.76,.86].  
A significant interaction was found for Complexity by Event-type F(1,56)=56.00, 
p<0.001, η2=.26. Complex environmental trials (M=0.68, SD=0.32) had a lower solution rate 
than complex conflict trials (M=0.88, SD=0.15), simple conflict trials (M=0.98, SD=0.09) and 
simple environmental trials (M=0.94, SD=0.14). Another significant interaction was found 
for Complexity by Cost F(1,56)=6.81, p<0.05, η2=.11.  Complex trials were solved less often 
by the no cost group (M=0.69, SD=0.23) than by the cost group (M=0.86, SD=0.16), with no 
difference between groups for simple trials (Mcost =0.98, SD=0.07), Mno cost =.95, SD=0.13). A 
three-way interaction was found between Set, Complexity and Cost, F(1,56)=4.65, p<0.05, 
η2=.08. Inspection of Figure 5.1 below shows significantly lower solution rates for complex 
trials for the no-set group in the no-cost condition than all other conditions.  
All remaining interactions were not significant. This includes the two-way 
interactions of Complexity by Set, F(1,56)=0.16, p=0.69, Event by Set, F(1,56)=0.99, 
p=0.32, and Cost by Event, F(1,56)=1.73, p=0.19. The three-way interactions of Event by Set 
by Cost, F(1,56)=1.58, p=0.21, Complexity by Event by Set, F(1,56)=0.14, p=0.71, and 
Complexity by Event by Cost, F(1,56)=3.65, p=0.061. The four-way interaction for 
Complexity by Event by Cost by Set was also not significant, F(1,56)=2.885, p=0.09. 
  
 95 
Figure 5.1. Mean proportion of correct solutions for complexity and event-type, by set and 
cost (n=68). 
  
5.3.2 Solution times 
Mean solution times for Complexity and Event-type by Cost and Set are shown in Figure 5.2.  
A repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect for Complexity, with complex 
trials (M=24.7s, SD=9.3s) taking longer than simple trials (M=22.6s, SD=7.9s), F(1, 
60)=6.87, p<0.05, η2=.10, 95% CIs [22.4,27.0] and [20.5,24.6]. A significant main effect was 
found for Event-type, with conflict trials (M=20.6s, SD=6.13s) faster than environmental 
trials (M=26.6s, SD=11.0s), F(1,60)=38.33, p<0.001, η2=.39, 95% CIs [19.0,22.2] and 
[24.0,29.4]. The main effect for Cost was also significant, with the no cost condition 
(M=21.5s, SD=7.31s) faster than the cost condition (M=25.8s, SD=8.14s), F(1,60)=4.67, 
p<0.05, η2=0.7, 95% CIs [18.5,24.4] and [23.1,28.5]. The main effect for Set was not 
significant, F(1,60)=0.16, p=0.69. 
A significant interaction was found between Event-type and Cost, F(1,60)=5.87. 
p<0.05, η2=.09. Inspection of Figure 5.2 indicates that the cost group took longer to solve 
environmental problems (M=30.0s, SD=11.26s) than the no cost group (M=23.3s, SD=9.69s). 
A significant interaction was also found for Complexity by Event, F(1,60)=18.39, p<0.001, 
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η2=.24.   Simple conflict trials were solved more quickly (M=17.76s, SD= 5.77s) than simple 
environmental trials (M=27.36s, SD=11.45s), with little difference between complex 
environmental trials (M=25.94s, SD=12.24s) and complex conflict trials (M=23.50s, 
SD=9.64s). 
Figure 5.2. Mean solution times (in seconds) for complexity and event-type by cost and set 
(n=68).  
 
A three-way significant interaction was found between Complexity, Event-type and 
Set, F(1,60)=7.06, p=0.01, η2=.11. Examination of Figure 5.2 suggests that those in the set 
condition were significantly faster to respond to simple conflict trials than all other 
conditions. Another three-way interaction was significant between Complexity, Event and 
Cost, F(1,60)=4.50, p<0.05, η2=.07.   Solution times were slower for the cost group in when 
solving complex environmental problems than all other conditions.  
Two-way interactions that were not found significant included Complexity by Set, 
F(1,60)=1.27, p<0.26, Complexity by Cost, F(1,60)=2.88, p<0.09, and Event by Set, 
F(1,60)=0.01, p<0.97. Three way interactions that were not significant were Complexity by 
Set by Cost, F(1,60)=0.07, p<0.79, Event by Set by Cost, F(1,60)=0.02, p<0.90, and 
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Complexity by Event by Cost, F(1,60)=2.71, p<0.11.  
The four-way interaction for Complexity by Event by Set by Cost was also not 
significant, F(1,60)=0.08, p=0.78. 
  
5.4 Discussion 
Results from the previous experiments suggest that introducing a mental set inhibits 
solution rates on a complex trial when the set trial type and complex trial type share surface 
similarities (Experiment 1). Introducing feedback eliminates the detrimental effect of mental 
set (Experiment 2), but receiving feedback does not necessarily lead to participants using 
optimal strategies, but instead using heuristic recognition strategies that were better refined 
with feedback. Experiment 3 examined whether introducing cost of failure would promote a 
change to an optimal (inference-based) strategy.  
The results show that imposing a cost for failed trials does lead to higher solution 
rates. This improvement was also accompanied by an increase in solution times for those in 
the cost group compared to the no cost group, suggesting that when there is a potential for a 
penalty it encourages people to alter their problem-solving strategy to a slower but more 
accurate inferential strategy. However, it is still not clear what the nature of this change is. It 
could be that cost makes participants take more care, perhaps double-checking their 
reasoning so that they are more likely to arrive at the correct solution or pick up on errors. 
Alternatively, participants may employ more analytical strategies (such as logical reasoning, 
or algorithm generation) that require more cognitive resources, thus taking more time to 
complete the tasks, as there is now an incentive for increased attention and effort.  
The interaction between Complexity and Cost may provide support for the latter 
explanation.  Participants in the cost conditions showed higher solution rates for complex 
trials than those in the no-cost conditions, suggesting they used a more optimal strategy and 
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switched away from a default recognition strategy on these trials but not on simple trials.  
This indicates that by default, recognition heuristics were used to solve most problems, and 
even in the presence of a cost constraint, this strategy is sufficient for success. With complex 
problems, the same strategy is used unless the cost of failure is high, in which case 
participants were able to switch to an inferential strategy. 
An unexpected finding was the three-way interaction between set, complexity and 
cost for solution rates: Fewer complex problems were solved in the no-cost condition for the 
no set group. It could be that establishing a mental set confers a small benefit to problem 
solvers using recognition-based heuristics (in the no-cost condition where such strategies are 
suggested to dominate) for the detection of a change – this may be due to those experiencing 
the set become familiar with the problem-type used to establish the set. The idea of mental set 
is analogous to a ‘muscle memory’ for cognitive operators. By exposing participants to the 
same stimulus, they may become adept at recognising it, and then by extension, better at 
recognising when a new stimulus is not a match – a form of change-detection heuristic. 
Further evidence for the notion that mental set may confer a bonus to problem solvers 
exists in the solution time data. The set group responded significantly faster than those in the 
no-set group for simple conflict trials. This suggests that those in the set group are better at 
recognising simple conflict trials. This may benefit solution rates on complex problems by 
introducing a more rapid conflict/not-conflict classification. During the onset of a complex 
environmental trial, those in the set group are perhaps more aware of what a conflict looks 
like and notice subtle differences in input conditions, whereas those in the no set group do not 
pick up on the smaller differences and instead view the output conditions as the most 
diagnostic information. This could help explain why for the no cost group, those in the set 
condition were better at solving complex problems and explain the significant interaction.  
The key findings from this experiment are that introducing a cost for incorrect 
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solution improves solution rates. This could be due to selecting a more optimal strategy 
although it is not possible to determine what type of strategy this may be. The current 
experiment had an unequal number of each trial type. This is done for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the primary research question is about anomaly handling and one of the defining 
characteristics of an anomaly is its low frequency. If anomalies were frequent they would just 
be another problem type. One specific anomaly (complex environmental event) occurs only 
once in each block of six problems. The mental set that precedes this anomaly consists of 
four of the same simple conflict trials. Therefore, there will always be four times the number 
of simple conflict events as complex environmental events. To balance this lack of parity, six 
simple environmental event trials were used. This number is the same as the number of 
complex environmental events and can be used to check the effect of frequency. If low 
solution rates occurred for both simple and complex environmental events then it would 
suggest that their low frequency could be responsible. However, in our experiments simple 
environmental (6 trials) and simple conflict (24 trials) have similarly high solution rates while 
complex environmental trials (6 trials) have significantly lower solution rates, suggesting that 
poor performance is due to complexity rather than frequency. This again reaffirms the 
previous research on cues as a valid measure of creating a paradigm in which complex 
problems exist using minimal information by designing the problems in such a way that cue-
dependency can effect solution rates across different types of problem. However, it would be 
interesting to find out what happens when the cues weighing in favour of the problem-type 
used to establish the set is different to the cues used for the majority of trials, which is the 
basis for the next experiment. 
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6 Experiment 4: Manipulating mental set 
6.1  Introduction. 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 had unequal numbers of each trial type. As outlined in the 
discussion of Experiment 3, this was necessary for the creation of anomalies, which by their 
very nature must be lower in frequency than standard events. One potential issue arises from 
this around the establishment of mental set, which is achieved using a series of similar event 
types. In the experiments reported so far, the event type used to establish the mental set was 
the same event type that was also the most frequently occurring.  
However, given that mental set may induce a familiarity with simple conflict events 
that may actually improve detection of complex environmental trials (seen in Experiment 3), 
there has not yet been a thorough attempt to separate the effects of mental set from the impact 
of stimuli familiarity. Experiment 4 was conducted to alter two factors that have remained 
constant in previous experiments. The first was to reduce the overall number of simple 
conflict trials, in order to reduce the potency of a single recognition heuristic strategy while 
still testing the effects of mental set. The second was to reduce the familiarity of simple 
conflict trials, by using complex conflict problems to create the mental set. Complex conflict 
trials introduce more noise and so are less easy to form a stable prototype of what a conflict 
looks like in the set condition. This may reduce the ability to solve complex problems in 
participants who attempt to solve complex problems by noticing the onset of change rather 
than utilising more analytical strategies. So far, a single cue, the weapons data, has been 
sufficient to successfully complete the majority of problems. By changing the type of 
problem used to establish set we can eliminate a single cue from being as important. 
Besides the introduction of an additional level of set, a further difference in this study 
was an adjusted base-rate for trial types. In previous experiments, the trial type used to create 
mental sets also occurred with the highest frequency. In this study, the base rates of trial types 
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were changed so non-set trials were at a higher frequency than trials used to establish sets. 
This change was introduced to determine whether the impact of a repetitive consecutive 
series of trials of the same event type is truly one of mental set, and not just one of stimuli 
familiarity. Previous experiments used conflict event trials to establish a set in a paradigm 
where conflict trials also represented the largest number of trials to be solved. In Experiment 
4, conflict events were used to establish the mental set but the number of environmental trials 
was also increased. This change allowed the differences in strategy used to solve set- trials or 
to solve the most frequently occurring trial type to be explored.  
The structure of this experiment allows a number of hypotheses. Firstly, when the 
trial-type used to establish set requires more cues to be used, then this will make it harder to 
distinguish the onset of a complex trial. In this case, when complex event trials are used to 
establish a set, we expect solution rates on the subsequent complex environmental event trials 
to be lower than compared to a set of simple conflict event trials.  
Secondly, as discussed in Experiment 3, being exposed to similar stimuli repeatedly 
may not only establish a set, but also allow that set to confer the ability to better identify 
problems of the same nature. Therefore, when there is no set established, it was expected that 
participants would take longer to solve simple trials, and also experience reduced solution 
rates as a result of not having the sustained familiarity with a particular trial type that can be 
used to identify a correct solution. 
 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants  
Participants were recruited online through social media and online advertisement. A 
total of 46 participants were recruited for this study (17 female, 29 male). Age of participants 
ranged from 18 to 54 (M = 25.77, SD = 8.7). Online recruitment extended the geographical 
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reach of this research; participants came from the United Kingdom (n=18), United States of 
America (n=14), Australia (n=3), Canada (n=3), Germany (n=2), Jamaica (n=1), Mexico 
(n=1), New Zealand (n=1), Poland (n=1), and Russia (n=1). All participants were fluent in 
English. Participants were explicitly instructed to not take part in this research if they had 
familiarity with the paradigm by completing previous online research (Experiment 2). A 
further 61 participants began the experiment but did not finish, these participants were 
considered to have withdrawn and were excluded from analysis. 
6.3.2 Design 
A 2x2x3 mixed design was used for this study. A between-subjects factor of Set had 
three levels (no set, simple set, complex set). Within-subjects factors of Complexity (simple 
trials, complex trials), and Event-type (conflict event, environmental event) were as in 
previous experiments.   
6.3.3 Materials 
The system, rules and participant interactions were the same as in previous 
experiments, and only the composition of trials was changed. In this study, 54 trials were 
presented across 3 problem blocks. A problem block consisted of 18 trials that culminated 
with a complex environmental event trial. In the simple set group, this end trial was preceded 
by five simple conflict event trials (similar to how mental set was established in previous 
studies). In the complex set group, the end trial was preceded by five complex conflict event 
trials. In the no set group, the final trial in each problem block was preceded by a variety of 
all possible trial types.  
Trials of the simple set and the no set groups were identical but in different orders. 
These were 15 simple conflict event trials, 24 simple environmental event trials, 6 complex 
conflict event trials, 6 no-event trials and 3 complex environmental event trials. The complex 
set group had complex conflict event trials to establish set rather than simple conflict event 
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trials, for a final composition of 15 complex conflict event  trials, 24 simple environmental 
event trials, 6 simple conflict event trials, 6 no event trials, and 3 complex environmental event 
trials. The specific order of these trials can be found in Appendix 2.  
6.3.4 Procedure 
The experimental procedure was the same as in Experiment 2. The study was hosted 
online using a researcher-owned web address. This web address was circulated online among 
academic interest groups in order to attract suitable participants. Participants visiting the web 
address were welcomed, presented with an information sheet and consent form. Participants 
were informed that participation was voluntary and that they could exit the study at any time 
without repercussion by closing the web browser. Participants were then presented a set of 
instructions that inform the participant about the system they are about to use. Rules were 
explained, examples were given, and participants were allowed to explore this until they felt 
ready to begin (Same materials as found in Appendix 1). Once participants were ready they 
could begin the experiment. After each decision was submitted, the participant received 
feedback informing them of the correct response to each problem. 
 
6.4 Results 
Data include the categorisation decision made by the participant for each trial, and the 
time taken to make that decision. A trial was considered correct if the participants’ 
categorisation was consistent with the trial event-type classification. For the purpose of 
analysis, answers were converted into solution rates for each trial type.  
6.4.1 Solution rates 
Figure 6.1 shows the proportion of correct responses for each condition in Experiment 
4.  A mixed ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of correct responses across Event-
type, Complexity, and Set. No significant main effect was found for Set, F(1,43)=1.67, 
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p=0.2.    A significant main effect was found of Complexity, with simple trials having a 
higher solution rate (M=0.96, SD=0.12) than complex trials (M=0.83, SD=0.22), 
F(1,43)=32.91, p<0.001, η2=.43, 95% CIs [.93,.99] and [.76, .89]. A significant main effect 
was also found for Event-type, with conflict events being solved more often (M=0.95, 
SD=0.14) than environmental events (M=0.84, SD=0.21), ), F(1,43)=24.07, p<0.001, η2=.36, 
95% CIs [.91,.99] and [.78, .90]. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Mean proportions of correct solutions for Complexity and Event type by Set 
(n=46). 
 
A significant interaction was found between Complexity and Event-type, 
F(1,43)=5.91, p<0.05, η2=.12. Examination of Figure 6.1 suggests complex environmental 
events (M=0.73, SD=0.31) had lower solution rates than complex conflict events (M=0.92, 
SD=0.23), while solution rates did not differ for simple environmental events (M=0.94, 
SD=0.20) and simple conflict events (M=0.98, SD=0.06). A three-way interaction was also 
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found between Complexity, Event type and Set , F(2,43)=3.75, p<0.05, η2=.15. Figure 6.1 
indicates this interaction is due to reduced solution rates for both set conditions for complex 
environmental events. 
All other interactions were not significant. These were the two way interactions for 
Complexity by Set, F(2,43)=1.30, p<0.29, and Event by Set, F(2,43)=1.16, p<0.32. 
6.4.2 Solution times 
A mixed ANOVA was conducted on the solution time data (means shown in Figure 
6.2).  A significant main effect was found for Complexity, with complex trials (M=24.1s, 
SD=8.27s) being slower than simple trials (M=20.5s, SD=9.08s), F(1,44)=10.65, p<0.005, 
η2=.20, 95% CIs [21.62, 26.57] and [17.78, 23.17]. Main effects for Set (F(1,44)=0.40, 
p=0.6), and Event-type (F(1,44)=2.95, p=0.09) were not significant. There were no 
significant interactions. These interactions were Complexity by Set, F(1,44)=0.35, p<0.71, 
Event by Set, F(1,44)=1.89, p<0.16, Complexity by Event, F(1,44)=0.01, p<0.98, and 
Complexity by Event by Set, F(1,44)=2.45, p<0.10. 
 
Figure 6.2. Mean solution time (in seconds) for complexity, event type and set type (n=46). 
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6.5 Discussion 
Previous experiments established that complex trials are more difficult and take 
longer to solve than simple problems (Experiments 1, 2 and 3). Experiment 1 also indicated 
that exposure to a mental set (established with a series of concurrent and consistent trial 
types) reduced solution rates for complex trials when the trial type used to establish the set, 
and the complex trial type share surface similarities. In Experiments 1-3, set was established 
using simple conflict problems. Similarity with simple conflict trials is seen in the complex 
environmental trial, as both problem types have the same identical final distribution of 
weapons.  
Results from Experiment 4 are consistent with previous findings. Solution rates were 
lower and solution times were longer for complex than simple trials. Participants were less 
successful at correctly identifying environmental than conflict events, and complex 
environmental events were hardest to identify.  In this experiment, the complex set condition 
exhibited lower solution rates than the simple set condition for the complex environmental 
event trial, supporting our hypothesis that the more similar the set-making trial type is to the 
subsequent different problem, then the more likely that an error would occur. In this study, 
the simple set condition was consistent with previous implementations of mental set, where a 
series of consecutive simple conflict events were used to establish mental set prior to the trial 
type that shares similarity, the complex environmental problem. In the complex set condition, 
complex conflict event trials were used to create the mental set prior to presentation of a 
complex environmental event. The impact of this manipulation was significantly reduced 
solution rates for complex environmental events compared with complex conflict events in 
the complex set condition.  
This result can be explained using the same surface similarity argument given in the 
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previous chapter for the initial creation of mental sets. Previous experiments indicated that 
establishing a mental set affects solution rates due to similarities between the set trial type 
and the subsequent different trial that possesses similar characteristics. By presenting a series 
of trials of the same type, the participant may use recognition heuristics to classify the trials 
they are familiar with. This is efficient because the simple trial types have distinct surface 
details that can be used to separate and classify (two very different weapon distribution 
profiles that are immediately apparent between conflict events and environmental events). 
However, the complex trial types are functionally different from the set trial type, although it 
does share some surface features with the set trial type. Solution rates in set conditions in 
previous experiments were reduced, we propose, because participants used surface features as 
categorisation criteria and thus encounter problems only for the target trial type. 
Surface similarity on our trials can be described as a binary status of ‘hit’ or ‘miss’ 
that comes from the two main cues within the task; input data (environmental data) and 
output data (weapons data). A ‘hit’ would be defined as a relevant change within either data 
set that would have consequence on the classification of the trial. For example, simple 
conflict event trials have a ‘hit’ in the output data (a sharp increase in weapons), and a ‘miss’ 
in the input data (no environmental metrics make a discernible change). Simple 
environmental event trials act oppositely and have a ‘hit’ in the input data and a ‘miss’ in the 
output data. When using simple conflict event trials to establish a set, it could be that 
participants begin to look for these hits in the output data only, and limit their strategy to 
using a single cue, which would then result in problems when facing complex environmental 
event trials which possess a ‘hit’ in both input and output data. If a participant with an 
established set was using the ‘hit’s in the output data only, they would fail to differentiate 
these trial types leading to the observed lower solution rates for complex environmental event 
trials. Complex conflict trials also possess a ‘hit’ in both input and output data, as they 
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contain both a drastic increase in weapons indicative of a conflict, but also have movement 
within the environmental metrics. This additional similarity may explain why establishing a 
set using complex conflict event trials is more detrimental to performance on complex 
environmental event trials, as they experience even more surface similarity than simple sets. 
A limitation of previous studies has been that the trial type used to establish mental 
sets has also been the predominant trial type in terms of frequency of occurrence. This leaves 
a question as to whether mental set or familiarity, derived from being the most common trial 
type, has the most effect on the reduced solution rates to complex problems.  This study 
addressed this concern by changing the base rate for frequency of occurrence for trial types. 
Previous studies established sets with conflict event trials, and as a result, conflict event trials 
were the majority of trials. In this current study, conflict event trials were retained as the 
establishing set trial type, but problem blocks were expanded, and environmental event trials 
were made the most occurring trial type.  
Previous experiments have found that not being exposed to a mental set gave higher 
solution rates, a result attributed to the lack of interference from mental set. However, this 
study found that the no set condition solution rates were lower for simple trials compared to 
both set conditions, lower for complex conflict event trials compared to both set conditions 
and were lower than simple set for complex environmental event trials. This can be 
interpreted as both a barrier to success for the no set condition, and as the set conditions 
conferring a benefit and facilitating problem solving. This notion of mental sets facilitating 
problem solving was first encountered in Experiment 3, where advantages in solution times 
were found for the set condition in identifying simple conflict trials. It was argued that this 
benefit is mainly conferred to identifying set-consistent trials. In the current study, both set 
type conditions have improved solution rates over the no set condition for simple 
environmental event trials, simple conflict event trials, and complex conflict trials. This 
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benefit could be due to the familiarity with conflict event trials that are exposed to 
participants in succession during the set establishment and the subsequent development of 
prototypes. The set group are also familiar with the environmental event trials due to their 
high rate of occurrence. This allows those in the set conditions to establish a quick 
recognition-based dichotomy between conflict and environmental events that allows more 
accurate classification of simple trials. Those in the no set condition do not experience or gain 
familiarity with conflict event type problems and so do not have a repertoire of these trial 
types. Conversely, complex set, while appearing to confer a benefit in the instance of simple 
trials and set-congruent trials, also suffers in the complex environmental event trials as 
reasoned above due to surface similarity. 
Overall, this study suggests that familiarity with event-types may be an important 
factor on successful solution of trials, and that experiencing a mental set may facilitate this 
familiarity. This can be seen in improved solution rates for some trial types in both set 
conditions. However, the complexity of the set has an effect on complex trial solutions if the 
set trial types have surface similarity with the target complex trial. It was found that when the 
set trial type, and the target complex trial type that followed the set, shared more similarity, 
then solution rates decreased. This is manifested by the complex set condition have the 
lowest solution rates for the target complex environmental event trial.  
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7 Experiment 5 –Protocol analysis of strategies 
7.1 Introduction 
Previous experiments have shown the influence of factors affecting solution rates to 
complex problems presented using the anomaly handling paradigm. Changes in behaviour 
were elicited by the manipulation of feedback, mental set, cost, and problem frequency. 
These effects have been discussed in terms of the strategies used by participants, and while 
strategic differences have been supported by the data, they themselves have not been 
subjected to objective scrutiny. For example, Experiment 2 introduced feedback and found 
that this greatly improved solution rates. However, it remains unclear whether it was due to a 
switch away from heuristic strategies found to be inadequate, or through an improved 
recognition ability. While these were discussed there was no single approach supported by 
the evidence. Similarly, Experiment 3 introduced cost of failure, and showed that while this 
promoted a switch to a more efficient strategy, what these strategies were was unclear.  
In this chapter, a descriptive account of what strategies participants were using, and 
how these correlate with success, was developed through analysis of participant protocols. 
This study was an investigation into the strategies are being used and whether these changed 
based on the types of problem encountered.  
One such method for capturing the descriptive nature of what each participant is doing 
when they are completing the task is the ‘think-aloud’ method of capturing verbal protocols 
(Ericson & Simon, 1998). This is where participants are prompted to think out loud and 
verbalise their thoughts while simultaneously completing the task, in order to obtain 
information around what aspects of the simulation is being attended to and what information 
elements contained within the simulation are being used during decision-making. This 
methodology has also previously been used successfully to explore reasoning (Ball, Ormerod, 
& Morley, 2004). This provides valuable insight into how participants go about completing 
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the task that has not previously been studied in such detail. By making participants verbalise 
their thoughts as they complete the task, the aim was to examine the separate cognitive 
operations participants use when navigating the data elements contained within the 
simulation. By examining data at such a level, we can create a series of hypotheses around 
how such cognitive operations are organised. 
Firstly, it was predicted that the number of cognitive operations exhibited by 
participants in undertaking complex problems would be greater than simple problems. 
Complex problems by their nature require more thinking to arrive at the correct answer, so 
confirming this hypothesis indicates the validity of using verbal protocol methodology and 
evidence that participants are able to accurately report on their thoughts during completion of 
the task. 
Secondly, it was predicted that solutions to conflict problems would show fewer 
cognitive operations than environmental problems because the data structure of an 
environmental problem is different to that of a conflict problem. As explored in the 
discussion of Experiment 2, our simulation can be described as two data streams – ‘input’ 
(environmental data) and ‘output ‘weapons data’. A conflict problem can be represented by a 
disturbance within one data stream (output), whereas environmental problems have 
disturbances in both data streams. While the logical complexity of simple conflicts and 
simple environmental problems are the same, it may be that the differences in data structures 
necessitate additional cognitive operations for the identification of environmental problems.  
Thirdly, there will be consistencies in the order that cognitive operations are used 
across multiple problems that will allow the mapping of a general problem-solving process. It 
is expected based on results of previous experiments that participants may be using heuristic 
strategies. These strategies will be possible to identify with the use of verbal protocol 
analysis. If these strategies are taking place, then it would be expected that some participants 
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will refer to single cues during problem completion and will not refer to other cues that are 
required for inferential reasoning. 
 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants 
Four volunteers were recruited from the local area. Ages ranged from 25-33 (M=27.8, 
SD=3.6), with three males and one female. 
7.2.2 Design 
A 2x2 within-subjects design was used for this study. Within-subjects factors of 
Complexity (complex trials, simple trials) and Event-type (conflict event, environmental 
event) were retained. As with all previous experiments, this created four distinct trial-types; 
simple conflict event, simple environmental event, complex conflict event, and complex 
environmental event.  
7.2.3 Materials 
The task used in this study was the same computerised version of our anomaly-
handling paradigm used in previous experiments. The paradigm is a classification task where 
participants must evaluate each trial and categorise it based upon event-type (conflict or 
environmental).  
Instructions were included within the system that detailed how to complete the task 
and explained the rules of the system. There were a total of 54 trials. These 54 trials consisted 
of 24 simple conflict trials, 6 simple environmental trials, 12 complex conflict trials, 6 
complex environmental trials and 6 no event trials. A Samsung S6 mobile recording device 
was placed on the table to ensure capture of the participant’s verbal protocol. 
7.2.4 Procedure 
Each participant was seated at a desk containing a desktop computer and the recording 
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device. Information sheets were distributed to participants explaining the nature of the 
experiment before gaining their informed consent. Once consent had been obtained, 
participants were directed towards the computer, where a computerised tutorial explained the 
nature of the task, the rules of the simulation, and how to record responses. Once participants 
had completed this section, the participants were given advice on verbalising their thoughts. 
It was explained that the experimenter would give prompts if the participant fell silent for 
more than 5 seconds. After this advice, participants were given an opportunity to practice the 
verbalisation process by making a drawing on the computer whilst verbalising. This gave an 
opportunity for participants to practice verbalisation and gain an understanding of what was 
expected. After this practice, each participants was given the opportunity to ask questions to 
the researcher. After this, the voice recorder was switched on and the participant was directed 
to begin the first task. During the task, participants were given feedback of the correct 
solution after submitted each trial. 
7.2.5 Verbal protocols and cognitive operations 
After the study was completed, the voice recordings were transcribed by the 
researcher. This process involved listening to the recordings, and creating a written version of 
what each participant said during their verbalisations while completing of each of the 54 
individual trials. The researcher manually defined the boundaries for each trial, and then like-
for-like transcribed the participant’s response for that trial.  
Once all transcriptions were completed, the researcher read and familiarised 
themselves with the resulting transcripts and generated a list of cognitive operations that were 
performed by participants. The list of cognitive operations resulting from the scanning and 
familiarisation process were: 
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Cognitive Operation Description Example 
Scan data stream Scanning or reference to 
examination of data in the 
environmental and weapons 
streams 
“Conditions look stable” 
“Looking at the weapons 
now” 
“By looking at the weather” 
Identify change Identification or reference to 
finding a significant change in 
data streams 
“I see a spike in Zone A” 
“The river is flooded” 
Reference magnitude  Reference to understanding  the 
scale of a change found 
“Weapons in B have 
quartered” 
“Zone C and D have halved” 
Create hypothetical Reference to the relationship 
between rules and how it should 
influence the system / data 
streams 
“If the mountain pass 
freezes, then A should go 
down…” 
Test hypothetical Search for information to test an 
observed hypothetical 
“…A has gone down as 
expected…” 
Seek verifying 
information 
Search for additional information 
that reinforces an already held 
belief 
“…and we would then see B 
and C go up, which they do” 
 
Discover a violation of 
expectation 
Find information that runs 
contrary to what was expected 
“So B and C should go up, 
…but C hasn’t…” 
Generate solution Express an understanding of the 
nature of the trial 
“…So that must mean there 
is a conflict in Zone B” 
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Once the cognitive operations were identified, the verbalisation of each trial was 
coded for the operations present and the order in which they occurred. This allows us to see 
how many operations were conducted for each individual trial. During the coding of the 
cognitive operations, both the “Scan data stream” and “Identify change” were only coded 
once for each data stream (environmental conditions, weapons).  
 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Cognitive Operations 
Each trial’s verbalisation was coded for the number of operations present. This allows 
the examination of the number of cognitive operations present during the solution of each 
individual trial. Of the 216 trials recorded, only 167 resulted in a verbal protocol. On some 
trials participants did not provide a verbal protocol because they immediately solved the 
problem without verbalisation, or recordings were indecipherable due to equipment failure.  
A t-test was conducted on the number of cognitive operations recorded for simple 
versus complex problems. A significant difference was found in the number of operations 
present for simple problems (M=4.95, SD=1.26) than complex problems (M=6.76, SD=1.44), 
t(166)=8.32, p<0.001.  The number of cognitive operations was also significantly lower for 
conflict events (M=5.33, SD=1.53) than for environmental events (M=6.36, 
SD=1.48),t(166)=3.16, p=0.001.. Table 6 shows the mean number of cognitive operations 
used for each trial type. 
Table 6. Average number of cognitive operations by complexity and event type (SD) 
  Simple Complex Average 
Conflict 4.66 (0.98) 6.81 (1.51) 5.33 (1.53) 
Environmental 6.10 (1.58) 6.67 (1.33) 6.36 (1.48) 
Average 4.95 (1.26) 6.76 (1.44) 
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7.3.2 Analysis of failed decisions 
Overall solution rates were extremely high (95%) and due to the verbalisation process, 
solution times were not included. However, it is possible to examine qualitatively the 
incidents of incorrect problem solving. A total of nine trials across all participants were 
responded to incorrectly. These consisted of three complex environmental trials, five complex 
conflict trials, and one simple conflict trial.  
The operations used on the failed simple trial were “Scan data (weapons) -> Scan data 
(environmental) -> Generate solution”. This shows that the participant failed to notice the 
abrupt change in the data streams, rather than misattributing the data change to an incorrect 
cause. Errors such as these can be deemed to be perceptual, a prominent factor discussed in 
Experiment 1. Not all significant changes in the data streams are of a similar magnitude: for 
example, Rainfall increases by over 500%, Temperature changes from a positive to a 
negative scale, and so these changes are easier to spot. However, seismic activity and changes 
in weapons merely double in size, and while both of these values double, there is still 
difference in absolute terms, for example, weapons will double from 400 to 800, whereas 
seismic activity data will double from 3 to 6.  While the scale of the change is the same, it 
should be easier to identify the change in weapons due to the increase in absolute values. 
While it is difficult to study this at a cognitive level, it is worth bearing in mind that not all 
errors are due to utilising incorrect problem-solving strategies, and that sometimes 
participants weren’t aware there was a problem to solve. 
Moving on to the failure to correctly identify complex conflict trials, all five began 
with the participants scanning the weapons data and identifying the increase in weapons in 
one zone. This was followed up by the subsequent scanning of the environmental data and 
also identifying the increases in particular environmental conditions. Where participants then 
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failed is in the incorrect attribution that the identified changes in environmental conditions 
were responsible for the resulting increase in weapons. This is incorrect because there is no 
possible logical relationship between those particular input conditions that could create those 
output conditions. By examining specific protocols we can see this misattribution being 
made. For example; 
 
“Spike in Zone C, just over 50% drop in Zone B. I see large seismic activity, Zone D 
would have dropped about the same…and it has, Zone A has come down in line with its 
normal thing, so this one’s going to be environmental” 
In this example, the participant scans the weapons data stream and correctly identifies 
an increase in Zone C (“Spike in Zone C”). The participant then references the size of the 
reduction in another zone (“…just over 50% drop in Zone B”). The participant now scans the 
environmental stream and identifies a change in the seismic activity (“I see large seismic 
activity”). Here the participant then creates a hypothetical relationship between that 
environmental condition and its effect on weapon supply (“Zone D would have dropped 
about the same”). The participant then seeks information to test that hypothesis (“…and it 
has”). It is at this stage where the participant now makes an incorrect attribution (“Zone A 
has come down in line with its normal thing”). The participant incorrectly normalises the fact 
that weapons have decreased in Zone A, despite there being no environmental reason for 
doing so, which should indicate a conflict.  
Some insight into why the participant made this error can be found in their 
phraseology “Zone A has come down in line with its normal thing”, what is meant by 
‘normal thing’ in this context is not certain, what makes the participant think that decreases 
are expected and normal? Further insight into this can be seen in the participants answer to 
the trial that directly preceded the current one, where Zone A decreased due to an 
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environmental cause and the participant stated “…that may be environmental as Zone A is 
coming down [in the presence of the correct environmental condition]”, it may be that the 
participant is now incorrectly transferring information from the previous trial into this new 
trial and thus allowing the misattribution.  
An examination of another failed complex conflict task shows how similar 
misattributions can arise: 
“Increases in B and the rainfall increases, so that would mean you can’t get to C and 
D, but the temperature stays the same so that wouldn’t stop you getting to A, although A is 
slightly higher than C and D. I think it’s probably environmental.” 
In this protocol, the participant correctly identifies changes in both data streams 
(“Increases in B and the rainfall increases”) and goes on to establish a prediction based on 
relationships (“so that would mean you can’t get to C and D, but the temperature stays the 
same so that wouldn’t stop you getting to A”), the next operation is where the potential 
misattribution occurs (“although A is slightly higher than C and D”). The participant 
compares Zone A to Zones C and D. Zones C and D have been effected by both a conflict 
and an environmental trigger in this trial, effectively quartering, and as Zone A is only 
experiencing the conflict it decreases to half its usual amount. The participant compares A to 
C and D as a potential reason to say it’s due to the environment.  
However, the participant has previously established that there is nothing wrong with 
the environmental conditions concerned with supply to A. In this protocol, it appears that the 
misattribution occurs when comparing the size of the changes to other zones suffering from 
an environmental trigger. Could it be that when making inferences based on the relationship 
of the environmental data that other incorrect inferences could also be made when perceiving 
data moving in a similar direction? “Zone C and D have gone down, Zone C and D are 
caused by environment” is correct in this case, however, it is followed by the known data of 
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“Zone A has gone down” and is mistakenly followed up by the same conclusion of “Zone A 
is caused by the environment”. 
Further examination of misattribution can occur by examining the incorrect answers 
for the complex environmental trials. Take the following protocol as an example:  
“Zone B, there’s a big spike in B, A and C have dropped again, so that’s going to be a 
conflict in Zone B” 
Here we can see that the participant has no problems in scanning and identifying the 
change in the weapons data stream. However, they fail to utilise any information from the 
environmental data stream at all. This is evidence that the participant is utilising heuristic 
strategies by resolving what a conflict trial ‘looks like’ and matching this recognition based 
model to the current data. The participant takes no time to determine the logical relationships 
in the environmental data to ensure the cause of the change in weapons. There is no way to 
determine whether there is a conflict without examination of the environmental data and the 
only reasonable way in which the conclusion of a conflict can be arrived at is if the 
participant is using information learned from previous trials in this new scenario. Here we 
have another example of a transfer from one trial to another, furthering the evidence of use of 
cognitively cheap strategies. 
Not all errors were made by neglecting full information however, such as the 
following example: 
“Increase in B, the temperature decreases and the rain increases which would mean 
you can’t get to A, C and D so….I think it’s….a conflict.” 
Here the participant uses both weapons and environmental data, correctly identifies all 
relevant disturbances, creates a correct prediction based on the logical rules of the simulation, 
and then fails to attribute that prediction to the correct source. This is a different type of error 
to not fully utilising the information available, and in fact this participant predicts perfectly 
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what should happen to weapon supply given the environmental constraints, thus 
demonstrating a good understanding of the simulation. However, when it comes to delivering 
an answer, the participant chooses the incorrect one. This shows that there is diversity in the 
ways in which misattributions and mistakes can be made. 
 
7.3.3 Creating a strategic model to represent decision making 
Overall, there were two dominant strategies that were used by participants that were 
successful. The first strategy was that of scanning environmental data. Once the 
environmental data has been scanned, if there were no changes detected, then the weapons 
data would be scanned. If no changes were detected here, a ‘no change’ solution was 
generated. If a change was found, then a ‘conflict’ solution would be generated. However, if 
a change was found in the environmental conditions, then a prediction would be created 
about what should happen to weapon supply. If this prediction was reflected in the data, a 
conclusion of ‘environmental’ was given, and if the expectation was violated, and the 
weapons data was anomalous compared to prediction, then a conclusion of ‘conflict’ would 
still be generated. This strategy of ‘environmental first’ was observed only in one participant, 
who used it to achieve a 100% success rate across all trials.  
The second most dominant successful strategy was that of ‘weapons first’. In this 
strategy, participants would first scan the weapons data stream and look for any change. If no 
change was found, then a ‘no change’ conclusion could be given. If a change is found in 
weapons, then the environmental data could be scanned, if no change was found here, then a 
‘conflict’ conclusion could be given, but if a change in environmental conditions was found, 
the relationship would have to be tested, resulting in a ‘conflict’ or ‘environmental’ 
conclusion as appropriate. 
This strategy was used by three participants and has the benefit of quickly confirming 
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identifying simple conflicts which make up the majority of the trials. While this strategy may 
be useful for solving the type of problem that is most frequent, it carries the risk that heuristic 
strategies may be developed that allowed the participant to take shortcuts (such as relying on 
the weapons information only) which would still find success on the simple trials, but 
encounter errors in the complex trials. These errors would include not checking all available 
data to create expectations of the behaviour of the system, which was found in some of the 
verbal protocol error analysis above. 
7.4 Discussion 
Overall this study adds new knowledge of how participants make decisions using this 
experimental paradigm that adds weight to previous theorisation around mental set. This 
study was the first to qualitatively examine the types of strategies being used by participants. 
Participants used a think-aloud method of verbalisation to create verbal protocols. These were 
coded for the cognitive operations conducted by participants for each trial. It was found that 
there were statistically significant differences for the number of operations used. Complex 
problems required the use of more cognitive operations than simple trials, and that 
environmental trials required more cognitive operations than conflict trials.  
This method of verbal protocols also allowed in-depth descriptive qualitative analysis 
of what happens when trials were incorrectly solved. It was found that errors can arise for a 
number of different reasons. This includes perceptual errors, where participants do not notice 
a change in the data streams. While these are not as interesting as the cognitive 
misattributions, it is still important to know that these perceptual errors exist. Participants 
were sat in front of a screen in a simulated conflict scenario and were not able to correctly 
identify the numbers they were looking at. While this is startling, it was rare in our study, and 
one can only hope that experts in the field, with real risk, will not make the same mistake. 
There is little that can be done from a cognitive psychological standpoint to improve these 
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errors from being committed in the field, other than ensuring that people have adequate time 
to analyse data, and perhaps instead relying on distributed cognition where no one mistake 
can influence an entire outcome. It may be that these perceptual errors are also a result from 
the academic nature of research. Participants truly understand there is no real world harm 
from an incorrect decision and so may not use their maximum effort to ensure an correct 
solution. Hopefully, this would not be an issue in military, security, or other industrial cases. 
A further type of error that was found was that of transfer between trials. It was shown 
that in one trial, the incorrect decision was arrived at from the participant’s point of view by 
following the logical relationships within the simulation. However, it appears that the 
participant was using data from a previous trial in their current attempt to determine the cause 
of an event. This lead to inaccurate data being used in the consideration of the outcome, and 
thus the incorrect decision was made. This has many implications throughout this thesis. The 
transfer of knowledge and strategy feeds into the notion of mental set. If the specific data can 
be carried over from one trial to another, then the transfer of strategy seems not only possible 
but highly likely. This evidence of transfer also has implications for the application of the 
data-frame model (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006). The participant can be considered to 
have developed a ‘frame’ of reference for understanding and working with the data that had 
been observed until that point. The transfer of knowledge between trials would represent the 
repeated use of the same frame despite the introduction of new stimuli. The participant has 
failed to take this into account in the development of a new frame and instead applies 
previous understanding to the new problem, introducing error.  
Another method of failure that was found within protocols in this study was that of the 
evidenced use of heuristics. There was an example of a trial that was answered incorrectly 
because not all information in the system was attended to. This can have drastic ramifications 
as in this instance, the parts of the system not attended to held information necessary for the 
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correct classification of the problem. It can be theorised that the reason the participant felt it 
appropriate to adopt such heuristics was that they had worked previously on simple problems 
where it was successful on a number of consecutive occasions, and then this strategy was 
transferred to complex problems (the complex nature of the problem would not be salient to 
the participant until receiving feedback that their response was incorrect). 
This finding is also extremely crucial for the validity of this entire thesis. Up until 
now, the use of heuristic strategies has been hypothesised, and has been central to the idea of 
why mental sets are established. Where previous experiments have supported these ideas 
through quantitative data and suggested their presence, this study is the first time that such 
mental shortcuts have been captured and isolated as a cause for failure.  
However, different from previous studies, this experiment had extremely high success 
rates. It could be that the nature of collecting verbal protocols, and having participants think 
out loud has influenced the way in which trials were approached. Having participants talk out 
loud may have made them more aware of the evidence they were using to make their 
conclusions against, or they may have taken more time on each problem due to the nature of 
having to put their thoughts into words. While these factors that may explain why solution 
rates were so high, the fact that errors still occurred is impressive. It may be assumed that 
increase in error frequency for the non-protocol studies are due to committed the same errors 
identified here, but on an increased scale as they never have the opportunity to ‘catch 
themselves’ making a mistake and correcting it.  
Overall, this study adds weight to the nature of the errors that we have been 
discussing throughout this thesis, we have captured evidence of the use of heuristics, 
discovered new errors in the transference of data knowledge between trials, and confirmed 
that perceptual errors can and will occur in any complex system.  
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8 General Discussion 
8.1 Aims and Overview  
Overall, this thesis has aimed to accomplish two things; first, to establish a novel 
paradigm capable of testing anomaly handling ability without requiring domain expertise, and 
second, to provide insight into the factors that contribute to success in an anomaly handling 
task based in the world of intelligence and conflict analysis. 
A brief overview of each experiment will be given prior to discussing in more detail 
their contribution to the objectives of this thesis, and the wider implications to the decision-
making and anomaly handling communities.  
For Experiment 1, a paradigm was developed where we could test the problem-
solving skills of participants as they attempted to identify and interpret anomalous events in a 
conflict simulation. The simulation presented participants with information about the security 
situation of a fictional country and the participant had to classify a situation as either posing a 
threat or not posing a threat. Participants had to classify a number of different types of trial. 
Anomaly trials were more complex than the other trials. Complexity was introduced by 
manipulating the number of cues that had to be attended to within the information 
environment of the task to reach a correct solution. This follows on from previous research by 
Fasolo, McClellend and Lange (2005), who discovered the more cues that needed attending 
to,  the more reported difficulty of a decision increased. This led to a hypothesis that 
problems that require more cues to solve correctly would be more difficult. Experiment 1 
found evidence that supported this, in that complex problems (depending on more cues) had 
lower solution rates and slower solution times than simple problems. This shows the 
importance of cue dependency to the difficulty of a problem, even with a minimal number of 
cues available.  
Experiment 1 also introduced the concept of establishing a mental set, which was 
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achieved via exposure to simple problems of the same type in a repetitive fashion. It was 
proposed that exposure to these repeated simple problems established a mental set within 
participants. Mental set was found to inhibit successful problem solving on subsequent 
complex problems when the problem had similar features (cue characteristics) to those in the 
problem types used to establish the set. Mental set is likely to have arisen due to the use of 
cognitive heuristics described in Chapter 1 (e.g., Evans, 1989; Fasolo, McLelland & Lange, 
2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The most dominant form of these heuristics appears to 
be recognition based, where individuals compare new cues to those previously encountered. 
This finding supports the qualitative model of sense-making of Klein, Moon, and Hoffman 
(2006) in their data-frame theory, where individuals use previously experienced exemplars to 
aid solution of novel problems However, whereas previous research found individuals can 
create adjustments from this recognition-based starting point, in Experiment 1, participants 
attempted to use the previously encountered solutions for solving the new problems without 
adjustment, and consequently failed.  
Experiment 2 examined the nature of feedback on performance. When given access to 
direct and immediate feedback (correct/incorrect), participants were able to overcome the 
negative effect of mental set found in Experiment 1. Feedback appears to have affected 
performance due to the correction of inappropriate strategy choices. Any use of heuristic 
strategies would fail on complex problems and participants would be notified of this in the 
form of an incorrect answer. This is supported by evidence that solution rates for the first 
complex problem were lower than all further presented complex problems, although this 
change over time narrowly missed significance (p=0.058).  
Learning over time has implications for research on mental set, as it shows that 
feedback is capable of breaking a set, and that once broken, mental set is not re-established 
for the same problem type. However, solution rates for complex problems were still lower 
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than those for simple problems. This means that while the mental set did not exacerbate the 
difficulty in solving complex anomaly problems, they were still solved less often than simple 
problems and so something about the nature of these complex problems still leads to lower 
solution rates. 
Experiment 3 attempted to increase solution rates for complex problems by 
introducing a penalty cost for incorrect decisions. This was achieved by the reduction of 
financial reward to participants for each incorrect answer given. This was found to increase 
the number of correct answers given when compared to those participants whose reward was 
not dependent on performance. Moreover, effects of set not only disappeared, but in some 
conditions were reversed (i.e., set condition participants outperformed no-set condition 
participants). This result suggests that when there are real stakes in the outcome of a decision, 
there may be more effort put into that decision that inoculates the participant to succumbing 
to mental set.  
The idea that there may be particular circumstances where exposure to a mental set 
confers a benefit when utilising sub-optimal heuristic strategies is a novel finding. One 
possible explanation for this unexpected result is that set encourages the rapid development 
of effective cue recognition when experiencing consecutive stimuli of the same type. It may 
be that, by detecting expected cues more effectively, minor differences (e.g., the presence of 
anomalous cues) are easier to recognise against a backdrop of expectation. Evidence in 
support of this account comes from the solution times. The usual effect of mental set is to 
speed up performance, since participants are applying a solution by routine. In this 
experiment, when not influenced by the presence of cost, solution times to the set conditions 
were actually slower than in the no-set conditions. This result is consistent with participants 
noticing an anomalous cue and switching to an inferential strategy in mental set conditions.  
This account of recognition of stimuli would fit within a single ‘frame’ as described 
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by the RPD data-frame model, and would only require adjusting when the participant is 
informed their solutions were incorrect. A frame is developed which can be used in the 
approach to solve encountered problems. The initial frame may be simple and use the least 
cognitive resources, thus relying on a single salient cue, but when participants are informed 
their answers are incorrect, participants must alter their frame to accommodate this new 
information and adjust the frame to a superior one that will not fail in the same situation.  
Experiment 4 aimed to identify the different contributions to successful anomaly 
handling of set establishment and familiarity with the stimuli type. This was achieved by 
changing the rate of occurrence so that the most frequent problem type and the problem type 
used to establish the mental set were different. Experiment 4 also examined the nature of set 
when established with different problem types. These changes resulted in two interesting 
findings. First, solution rates were higher for simple problems for those where a mental set 
was established compared to those without an established set. Second, the effect of mental set 
on complex problems was dependant on how similar the set-making and the complex 
problem were. 
This represents further evidence that there is a benefit to set in some instances. In this 
case, the rapid development of cue recognition gained by establishing the set can be used to 
solve simple problems effectively. When there was no set established, participants were less 
able to correctly identify simple problems suggesting that establishment of the mental set 
allowed those participants a better ability to detect when subsequent cues were a match.  
This effect of set establishing a strong ability for cue recognition provided a benefit 
on simple problems. However, this experiment also detected that when the set was 
established using complex problems (and thus more cues) that performance on other complex 
problems was lower. This can be explained by the type of cues present in the problems used 
to establish the set. The cues in complex problems used to establish the set (complex conflict 
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events) were more similar to the complex problems that suffered lower solution rates 
(complex environmental events). This means that the improved cue recognition ability 
supplied by establishing a mental set is only effective at differentiating problems based on 
simple recognition and is not powerful enough to aid complex problem solving. This shows 
that recognition heuristics can aid a switch in the strategy used to solve complex problems, 
but only if those recognition heuristics promote the ability to distinguish between problems. 
When the cues that have enhanced recognition (though mental set) are too similar to complex 
problems, then this strategic shift does not occur. 
Experiment 5 set out to gather further evidence of the strategies used by participants, 
by collecting and analysing verbal protocols from participants undertaking the task. The 
analysis allowed counts of cognitive operations to be made. These counts revealed, as one 
would expect, that complex trials involved more cognitive operations than simple trials, but 
also the environmental trials required more cognitive operations than the conflict trials. The 
study had higher solution rates than the previous studies, perhaps a by-product of verbalising. 
Nonetheless, participants still made many errors. Three main classes were observed: 
perceptual, where participants failed to see or misread key pieces of data; transfer between 
trials, where participants used data from previous trials to solve the current trial; and 
inappropriate heuristics, where participants used simple heuristics for trials that required 
inferential decision-making. 
The errors identified in Experiment 5 help explain performance on complex problems 
across previous experiments. Perceptual errors, where participants failed to notice the 
presence of cues, may be explained by the level of attention participants are applying to the 
task. Bettman, Johnson, Luce and Payne (1993) found that there was an association between 
effort and accuracy. If participants are not putting in the levels of effort necessary for the 
problem-solving to occur, then this will lead to failure on the task as participants are not 
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using required information to solve the problem. While this led to errors in Experiment 5, it 
also helps explain why errors were made across previous experiments. Experiment 3, where 
cost was introduced, gave participants a motivation to pay attention. As a result, there were 
increased solution rates in those participants that were financially rewarded. The presence of 
a financial reward itself cannot influence the strategy used to solve problems, so it may be 
that instead the reward encouraged participants to pay more attention and invest more effort 
into the task, and as a result, did not experience the same levels of perceptual errors incurred 
by participants that did not have a motivation for cognitive investment in the task. 
Errors that demonstrated transfer between trials may be a secondary effect of mental 
set. When set establishes an enhanced recognition ability for a specific cue by repeat 
exposure, it could be that this cue is then misattributed across trials where it is not present 
based on the prior frequency of the cue. While this is a type of perceptual error, it is 
fundamentally different to that described above. The previous discussed perceptual error 
deals with cues that are present but are not noticed, perhaps due to lack of attention or effort, 
whereas this type of error deduces that participants act as if a cue is present when it is not. 
This may be as a result of the established mental set, where after repeated exposure, 
participants learn to expect a certain cue or pattern of cues to be observed, and act as if it had 
occurred when it was not present in the task. 
The third type of error, that of using inappropriate heuristic strategies is one that can 
be found across previous experiments. Experiment 5 found evidence that some participants 
were using recognition heuristics which lead to failure on complex problems. In previous 
experiments, when establishing a mental set in a participant and that participant then uses 
enhanced cue perception to solve problems based on recognition heuristics, then this is one of 
the main reasons why performance is decreased on complex problems. However, if an 
inappropriate strategy is being employed, this can be moderated by the presence of feedback, 
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introduced with Experiment 2.  It may be that more of these heuristic strategies were being 
used more in Experiment 1 – which had the lowest solution rates found for complex problems 
across all experiments, as feedback was not available. When feedback was introduced in 
Experiment 2, there was an overall increase in solution rates across all problem types 
compared to those seen in Experiment 1. It could be that when using these heuristic 
strategies, and the strategy fails, and participants receive feedback that the response was 
incorrect, that this then moves participant away from such strategies. The errors identified in 
Experiment 5 offer a descriptive narrative of the problem-solving approach used. While the 
qualitative methodology and low sample size may make Experiment 5 stand out from the 
other experiments, it greatly aids the conclusions of all other experiments by finding 
describable errors and accounts for the pattern of results seen across previous experiments. 
 
8.2 Establishing the anomaly handling paradigm 
One of the major aims of this thesis was to develop a novel paradigm for testing 
anomaly handling. The construction of such a task was detailed in Chapter 2, where the 
merits of using simulated environments for decision-making research was discussed. We 
claim the anomaly-handling paradigm presented throughout this thesis is robust and complex 
enough for use in decision-making research. The paradigm has strong evidential support to be 
an effective tool in investigating decisions. This is claimed because our expectations in 
relation to how participants would perform on the task were largely confirmed, with these 
expectations being derived from psychological literature and research on real world decision-
making. That we could replicate the nature of mental set, and found success in describing our 
results using the RPD framework shows that behaviour on our task mimics real life decision-
making. 
The rules governing the anomaly handling paradigm were theorised to interact 
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creating both simple and complex scenarios. Throughout all of the experiments presented in 
this thesis, a significant main effect was found for complexity, where complex scenarios were 
solved less often than simple scenarios. This was a vital element of the development of a 
simulated environment. If all potential permutations of the systems were as easily solved as 
each other, then this would not have satisfied the requirement of being able to create 
anomalies in the form of complex problems.  
The system developed for use in these experiments was able to successfully create 
these anomalous scenarios using extremely limited information. The system only has two 
streams of data available to participants; the weapons distributions, and the environmental 
conditions. Despite access to such basic information, the rules still interacted in such a way to 
allow complex problems to exist, rather than creating a simple simulation that offers no 
ability to further examine complex decision-making. A benefit of using a low information 
environment was the ability to use the paradigm on novice populations. All of the participants 
used in studies presented in this thesis were either university undergraduates, or wider 
members of the general population from around the world recruited online. No specific or 
specialist requirement was necessary to take part in these experiments. No computing or 
logic-based training was required to take part, and no specialist knowledge of intelligence, 
defence, security or conflict analysis was required to take part. As a result, the evidence 
shown throughout the described experiments shows that most participants were able to fully 
comprehend the nature of the simulated environment very quickly as evidenced through high 
solution rates for simple problems throughout all the experiments. 
Another successful factor in the design and development of this anomaly- handling 
paradigm is its flexible nature. The version of the task used in this thesis relies upon a system 
of supply and demand – the logical rules for this were described in Chapter 2. Fundamentally, 
a finite resource is shared between a known number of locations, where the known local 
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conditions create predictable abnormalities in supply of the resource that lead to a possible 
determination between two causal events. The logic that underlies this system can be intact 
while changing a number of variables concerning the system itself. For example, the version 
of the task used in the described experiments used one resource (weapons) that were being 
supplied to four locations. Each change in supply due to the predictable abnormalities 
affected each of the locations equally.  
The system is flexible enough to allow a wide variety of changes while still keeping 
the functional core the same to allow analysis of decision-making skills in the anomaly-
handling environment. For example, the number of locations could potentially be increased to 
any desired level to represent a large area, the spatial relationship between the locations and 
the environmental blocker terrain features can be easily adjusted to represent actual 
geographic areas, and the specific post-event redistribution routes can be changed to 
represent local political alliances. All of these possibilities are capable of being implemented 
and represented within the simulated environment created for testing within this thesis. The 
system state shown in these experiments was programmed to be simple to allow the use of 
novice participants. The system was designed to be entirely modular, flexible and expandable 
so that any future research could be tailored to fit the needs to the participant population 
being tested. With the correct implementation, this anomaly-handling paradigm would be 
appropriate for the testing of experts in the security and defence industry providing more 
valuable insight into real world anomaly handling performance. 
This is an important distinction because while we have replicated known 
psychological issues with decision-making throughout this research, it was found while using 
naïve populations in laboratory settings. The failure to successfully solve our anomaly 
problems, while analogous to the false-positive of drone-striking an innocent target, does not 
match the training, cognitive ergonomic environment, or the safety procedures set-up within a 
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military environment. While we have shown that it is still possible to commit cognitive errors 
in the identification of anomalies, and we know there are instances within the military where 
rare events were failed to be interpreted correctly, it is difficult to determine what 
contribution our anomaly-handling findings had on the same tragedies we aimed to better 
understand. Drone strike errors, or any industrial anomaly handling error, may not be the 
result of a cognitive misclassification due to reliance on similar cue characters, but may also 
result from bad intelligence, a lack of attention, or a number of other reasons. So while we 
have been successful in matching some theoretical errors with performance on a simulated 
task, it is not possible to claim that these are the only reasons for failure in the real world. 
8.3 Boundaries of successful anomaly handling 
The second major aim of this thesis was to investigate the circumstances under which 
successful anomaly handling could occur. This was measured by the ability of our 
participants to successfully solve the complex problem types presented to them within our 
anomaly handling paradigm.  
Experiment 1 has shown that the ability to successfully interpret anomalies was 
diminished after exposure to a mental set. In this instance, the mental set was a concurrent 
series of problems that shares a single prominent familiar feature with that the complex 
problem. It was theorised that after exposure to this mental set, participants developed simple 
heuristics they used to aid in classification of the problem types, and that these heuristics 
centred on the same familiar feature present in complex problems. When participants 
subsequently apply the use of these heuristics in the incorrect classification of complex 
problems, they do so because they do not realise that the complex problems differ from the 
problems experienced previously during the establishment of the set.  
However, unlike previous set-making research, where sets were established using 
similarity in solution-approach (Luchins & Luchins, 1959), familiarity with problem-space 
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(Bilalic, McLeod & Gobet, 2008), and knowledge structure (Wiley, 1998) the sets in our 
anomaly handling paradigm were established using perceptual similarities that existed 
between simple problems and complex problems. We suggest that the establishment of a set 
is due to participants over-attributing an importance to a single cue within the information 
environment and fail on complex problems when this cue is no longer diagnostic of the 
correct solution. This supports the previous research of Klayman (1988) who found that 
participants when given multiple cues, will attribute their own weighting of importance to a 
cue based on the likelihood of an outcome. As the majority of our problems were simple, and 
a single cue was sufficient, participants relied on this to solve complex problems when that 
cue alone was no longer sufficient. 
We believe the results of our anomaly handling research can be successfully 
explained by the application of the RPDM framework. The RPDM framework suggests that 
problem-solvers will first compare a problem to similar problems experienced in the past. In 
this case, complex versions of an event appear more similar to the simple problems of the 
opposite event (i.e. complex conflicts appear similar to simple environmental events, and 
complex environmental events appear similar to simple conflicts). This similarity is based on 
the dependency of the cues determined above. Therefore, when participants experience a 
complex event, the most similar event available to that participant will be one that is of the 
wrong type. If solutions given by participants are based on their prior experience with the 
simple problems, then this will result in an error. This may be why we have seen lower 
solution rates for complex problems. Additionally, the RPDM framework may assist in the 
explanation of the effect of mental set. When a participant in the set condition is repeatedly 
shown a single problem type, they are better able to retrieve this from their repertoire of 
experience during the onset of the complex problem thus interfering more with the ability to 
generate a correct solution.  
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When comparing these findings to Experiment 2, the RPDM framework (Klein, 
Orasanu, Calderwood & Zsambok, 1993) is useful for explaining the pattern of results that 
were detected. It was found in Experiment 2 that introducing feedback was able to eliminate 
the effect of mental set. If, as RPDM suggests, participants compared new problems with old 
problems, and they are failing because they are comparing different types of event. When the 
feedback was shown to a participant after a wrong answer, they would find out that the 
problems in fact were not similar which prevented them from using this as a strategy again, 
whereas no such inoculation was provided in Experiment 1.  
 However, while eliminating mental set, solution rates for complex problem 
were still lower than simple problems, still demonstrating a lesser ability to deal with the 
anomalous events of the task. However, solution rates were increased in Experiment 2 
compared to Experiment 1 and this again could be explained by the literature on cue 
acquisition and the RPDM framework. While errors are made, and feedback is given, 
participants will have used cues from the task to associate that trial with previous trials of a 
different type. As an error has occurred, participants will now understand this new case was 
not like the previous cases they had matched it to, and so the dependence of a single cue to 
make that attribution should be lower in subsequent presentations of that problem. As such, 
participants are building a separate repertoire of what complex problems look like, and learn 
that to develop this, they must pay attention to additional cues. This allows the explanation of 
why complex problems were solved at a higher rate in Experiment 2 (89%) than Experiment 
1 (69%).  
Experiment 3 attempted to find other ways of improving performance on complex 
problems. It was found that by introducing and highlighting a cost of failure, then 
performance improved across all problem types. This is an important finding, as anomaly 
handling often occurs in high-risk environments where the consequence of failure is 
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potentially huge. However, if decision-makers and anomaly handlers in these industries are 
aware of such consequences then this may provide some measure of inoculation against 
failure. This matches the research on accuracy/effort trade-off found by Bettman, Johnson, 
Luce & Payne (1993). If we are to be more accurate in a task, then that will take more effort. 
Conversely, if lower effort is put into a task, this will result in less accuracy. While this may 
sound straightforward, this provides an exciting opportunity to bring the naturalistic RPDM 
framework and the theoretical cue acquisition literature together again. If success on the task 
can be measured by the participant matching a problem with previous problems, and we have 
already established that errors are due to participants matching the wrong type of problem. 
Then we can suggest that the higher solution rates when then was a penalty to failure was due 
to participants better matching the new problem with previous problems. As the complex 
problems were designed in a way that such a match relied on multiple cues, then we can 
assume that the better performance when there was a penalty was due to participants using 
more cues. As participants who faced a penalty were more accurate in these assessments, it 
suggests that they were expending more effort – a finding also supported by their increased 
solution times. This means that when more effort was put into the task, participants were 
better able to pay attention to multiple cues. As attention was paid to these cues, it allowed 
their repertoire of experience to not make the attribution errors found in Experiment 1 and 2 
at the same rates. This means that a heightened awareness to the cues, as a result of more 
effort put into the task via the threat of penalty, was able to develop a more sensitive model 
of recognition. While this is interesting for our research, it may also mean that the failures 
found on our task were often a result of participants not utilising the necessary effort to 
discriminate between cues. This may be good news to real-world anomaly-handlers such as 
drone operators or intelligence analysts who would be aware of the significance of their 
work, give it the attention and effort it requires, and thus offer defence against errors. 
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While the nature of a penalty improved performance, data from Experiment 3 also 
show a positive effect for mental set in the solution times for solving simple conflict 
problems. This type of problem was the same problem type used to establish the mental set. 
This shows that after exposure to a mental set, those participants are better able to identify 
problems that belong to the same family of problems as the mental set. It was theorised that 
this could be due to familiarity of what the set-making problems look like. For example, after 
experiencing a series of continuous simple conflict problems, participants develop awareness 
for what a conflict looks like, their repertoire of conflict is well established. This knowledge 
can then be later used to identify conflict problems faster than those participants who do not 
develop such extensive familiarity with a single problem type.  
Experiment 3 also found a benefit for mental set in the solution rates for complex 
problems when there was no cost. As the no cost group was believed to be using suboptimal 
mental heuristics as discussed previously, it could be that this familiarity with a single 
problem type confers benefits not only to faster recognising problems of the same type, but in 
also helping to identify when a problem is not the same. By becoming familiar with what a 
conflict looks like, when encountering the complex environmental problems that have the 
same weapons distribution as a conflict, participants in the set group know from experience 
that this is not a conflict as it does not match prior examples. In Experiment 1, there were 
only two blocks of problems, and so participants did not have the time to develop this 
familiarity, and so mental set acted a negative, as participants used prior experience as a 
misplaced solution aid, categorising the anomaly problems based on superficial details and 
approximate likeliness. However, in Experiment 3, there were six problem blocks giving 
participants three times as many conflicts to become familiar with. In this experiment, it is 
likely that participants have more time to establish a familiarity with the set-making problem 
and so can use this to their advantage. It is important to note that this benefit of mental set 
 138 
only occurs when potentially using sub-optimal heuristic strategies. When there was a 
penalty, it was believed that participants slowed down and took more care with their 
decisions, reflecting a more optimal approach due to more sensitivity to what type of problem 
they were encountering. For these cases where a penalty was present, there were no 
differences between set and no set groups.  
 This notion of familiarity conferring a benefit was tested further in Experiment 4. It 
was found that when the problem type used to establish the mental set was different from the 
most frequently occurring problem type, that those exposed to the set were better able to 
solve simple problems. This could be used to support the argument in Experiment 3 that 
exposure to a mental set helps develop a familiarity, which can further be used to aid correct 
classification. 
 However, solution rates for complex problems in Experiment 4 indicate that the more 
similar the set-making problem type is to the complex problem that comes after it, the less 
likely participants were to obtain a successful solution. This shows that while familiarity can 
be a helpful heuristic recognition tool used to classify the more distinct problem types, that 
mental set is still a burden when it comes to distinguishing perceptually similar but 
functionally different environments. 
Previously, mental set has only ever been explored within the psychological literature 
as a barrier to successful problem solving. Mental rigidity is a state that is universally 
discussed as conferring a negative to those that possess it. However, we have found a novel 
and adaptive use for such a phenomenon. We have found that mental set confers the benefit 
of establishing when something looks similar to something previously seen. This can have a 
number of benefits, such as the saving of cognitive effort when utilising adaptive heuristics 
such as the implementation of the data-frame model, and the RPD framework that suggest 
critical decision by industrial experts are often made by comparing their observations against 
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a repertoire of prior experience. Perhaps this mental set is a faster way of developing such an 
experience, and that it may be beneficial in the majority of cases when natural events are 
distinct from each other, it may only lead to negative consequences when there are high 
levels of similarity between observations and experience.  While it is novel to successfully 
explore a positive benefit of mental set in relation to successful anomaly handling, it appears 
that the more similar an anomaly is to its typical environment, the harder it may be to spot. 
8.4 Applications 
In terms of real world application for anomaly handlers and high risk decision makers, 
a number of possible applications and possible recommendations can be made on the basis of 
the studies described in this thesis.  
This research aimed to develop an anomaly handling simulation as a dynamic training 
tool for professions where pattern recognition and interpretation is required, and may be used 
to expedite the route to expertise in an environment where mistakes can be made safely. As 
discussed previously, the simulation developed for use in this thesis is a robust tool for 
creating anomaly problems. The context, domain, and difficulty of the simulation are all 
possible to be adjusted while still keeping the logical system rules in place that allow 
decision-making to occur. This system could be altered to meet specific situational training, 
could be delivered as an anomaly handling tool to teach more complex decision-making 
processes in general, and also demonstrate the negative effects of those things which impact 
upon successful decision making (mental set, unfamiliarity with environment, lack of 
awareness of cost). 
There is also the potential to develop decision-support tools that may increase the 
performance of professionals, where the consequences of failure are potentially catastrophic. 
In analytical fields systems could be developed that warn system users when they have been 
operating a similar environment for too long, as this could foster the development of a mental 
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set. Or additional process analysis could be done to integrate new business requirements such 
as alarms, when a small variance is detected from an otherwise similar state, as this is when 
error is more likely to occur.  
8.5 Future research 
Based on the findings in these studies, a number of potential future areas for research 
are worth mentioning.  Firstly, it would be important to the future success of this anomaly 
handling paradigm for it to be tested by experienced and expert decision makers from the 
same industry as the simulation is contextualised with. It would provide greater evidence for 
the value of the paradigm if expertise can be transferred from real world decision making 
tasks to success on the problems delivered using our simulation. This would establish the 
validity of the paradigm when discussing real world decision makers and make any 
conclusions about strategy use more applicable to the wide industrial audience. Testing 
experts would also allow new opportunities for the paradigm to be reconfigured into a larger 
and more complex simulated environment.  
Secondly, a number of theoretical conjectures were made in the analysis of results 
across experiments that would require resolution. While mental set provided a negative effect 
in Experiment 1 (due to similarity between set problems and complex problems), it provided 
a positive effect in Experiment 3 and 4 (due to stimuli familiarity). While the strongest 
reasons for these were theorised above, it would be beneficial to further examine the nature of 
these differences. This could be achieved using verbal protocols where participants talk 
through their decision making process. This would allow an evidence based rationale for why 
errors are being committed on complex problems and could test the current hypotheses stated 
for failure in this thesis. 
Thirdly, the paradigm used in this thesis aimed to be representative of systems used 
by anomaly handlers and decision makers in the real world. It would be to the value of this 
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research if more real world research could be undertaken that shows how decision makers 
operate in their natural environments to ensure that the paradigm is keeping pace with the 
industries in which it attempts to replicate. The findings found using this paradigm should 
also be validated in more contextualised scenarios which would require the study of real 
world environments and the decisions that are being made within them. A series of 
ethnographic studies should be completed that follow expert decision makers into their 
respective industries and attempt to validate the conclusions drawn from research using this 
paradigm. This would allow us to comment on the real extent that stimuli familiarity, or 
saliency of cost, or susceptibility to mental set, would have on real world decision makers for 
whom this research was intended to benefit. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
In summary, this thesis has presented a series of decision making studies using a 
novel paradigm to test a novel concept of anomaly handling. It has drawn on previously 
utilised psychological research, including mental set, as an attempt at understanding the 
failure of successful decision making for anomalous problems.  
It has been shown that the paradigm was successfully tested in a number of different 
iterations, from under laboratory-controlled settings using undergraduate psychology 
students, to online implementations that reached a global audience. This research has been a 
successful example of the development of a simulation for use in psychological research, and 
has offered a number of insightful findings around the nature of strategy use in such a 
complex environments, and has important consequences for those industries in which failure 
to handle anomalies correctly is not an option.  
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Appendix 1. Screenshots of the online task instructions 
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Appendix 2. Trial order for Experiment 4. 
Trial order over 3 blocks for No set (N), Simple set (S), and Complex set (C) conditions. 
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